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In the last few years, the Roberts Court has handed several high-profile
wins in labor and employment law cases to anti-labor and pro-employer
forces. These decisions include Epic Systems1 and Lamps Plus2 (applying
the Federal Arbitration Act to override collective remedies for employment
* Frank G. Millard Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to Matt
Bodie, Roberto Corrada, Charlotte Garden, Ryan Nelson, Jim Pope (as always), Margo
Schlanger, and participants at the Fourteenth Annual Colloquium on Scholarship in Employment and Labor Law for helpful comments on this piece. I particularly appreciate the editorial
assistance provided by the editors of the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review. In
the interest of full disclosure, I should note that I filed amicus briefs in two of the cases
discussed extensively in this piece, Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018), and
Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). The views expressed here are entirely
my own.
1
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1621 (2018).
2
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1415 (2019).
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law violations), Janus3 (invalidating, on First Amendment grounds, states’
requirements that their employees pay “agency fees” to unions that
represent them), and Hobby Lobby4 (applying the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act to override the Affordable Care Act’s “contraception
mandate”).
Dissenting justices and academics have charged that those decisions
represent a return to the rejected jurisprudence of the Lochner Era.5 In
response, defenders of those decisions—on and off the Court—have
disputed the Lochnerism charge. They have noted, in particular, that these
decisions do not invalidate statutes based on a supposed constitutional right
to freedom of contract; to the contrary, most of these decisions enforce
federal statutes against conflicting federal or state policies.6
The defenders of the recent Roberts Court decisions are right to identify
key distinctions between those decisions and the Lochner-era cases. But
there is an important sense in which the critics are correct: the Roberts Court
has replicated a key aspect of Lochner-era jurisprudence. Like the Lochnerera cases, the Court’s recent decisions rest on a principle of employee
consent that ignores many of the forces that actually impose limits on an
employee’s choice. As the Legal Realists of the first half of the twentiethcentury showed, constraints on choice are ubiquitous. Those constraints
ultimately derive from legal rules—both the specific rules that are
challenged in particular cases and the background rules of property and
contract that structure the distribution of wealth and bargaining power. The
Realists argued that taking some of these rules for granted while overriding
others on the ground that they disregard the choice of contracting parties
obscures the normative basis of (and perhaps the motivation for) the Court’s
decision. Based on this analysis, the Realists developed a powerful critique
3

Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2486 (2018).
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 736 (2014).
5
See Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1633–34 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Elizabeth Sepper, Free
Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1497 (2015); Mila Sohoni, The Trump
Administration and the Law of the Lochner Era, 107 GEO. L.J. 1323, 1383–84 (2019); see also
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2501 (accusing the majority of “weaponizing the First Amendment, in a
way that unleashes judges, now and in the future, to intervene in economic and regulatory
policy” and thereby “prevent[ing] the American people, acting through their state and local
officials, from making important choices about workplace governance”).
6
See, e.g., Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1630 (“Instead of overriding Congress’s policy
judgments, today’s decision seeks to honor them.”); id. at 1632 (“This Court is not free to
substitute its preferred economic policies for those chosen by the people’s representatives.
That, we had always understood, was Lochner’s sin.”); Thomas C. Berg, Religious
Accommodation and the Welfare State, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 103, 151 (2015). The unionfee cases did invalidate state statutes, but they did so based on the First Amendment, rather
than the liberty of contract. For the now-familiar arguments that many Roberts Court First
Amendment cases represent a revival of Lochnerism under a new guise, see Leslie Kendrick,
First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1199, 1208–09 (2015); Jeremy K.
Kessler & David E. Pozen, The Search for an Egalitarian First Amendment, 118 COLUM. L.
REV. 1953, 1959–60 (2018); Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for A
New Economy, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 197 (2015); Amanda Shanor, The New
Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 136–38 (2016).
4
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of many then-existing areas of jurisprudence, notably including the Lochnerera freedom-of-contract cases.
Although it has faded into the background, the Realist critique of
choice and consent offers a powerful framework for understanding key
current controversies in labor and employment law.7 In this article, I begin
by examining recent Roberts Court decisions and showing that, when
unpacked, they invoke at least two distinct and conflicting understandings of
employee and employer choice.8 I then turn to the Realist critique and
demonstrate that the recent decisions implicate that critique just as the
Lochner-era freedom-of-contract decisions did.9 Finally, I explore the
implications of the Realist analysis for several significant areas of
controversy that have not yet reached the Roberts Court—including the
application of labor and employment laws to the “fissured workplace” and
the “gig economy,” the question of the continuing vitality of employment at
will, and workers’ common law and statutory rights.10 I attempt to show that
employment law doctrine has never really shed the premises of Lochner.
The continuing Lochnerist premises of labor and employment law are
especially important today. Since the 1940s, labor’s share of national
income has dropped substantially.11 That “shift from wages [labor] to
7
This Legal Realist critique formed a key basis for Critical Legal Studies scholarship in
the 1970s and 1980s. See, e.g., MARK G. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
103–07 (1987); Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE
L.J. 997 1013–14 (1985); Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1361–68 (1984); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1758–60 (1976); Karl E. Klare, Workplace Democracy
and Market Reconstruction: An Agenda for Legal Reform, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 17–19
(1988); Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1529–30 (1983). More recently, scholars associated with the law and
political economy movement have sought to revive the insights of this work. See, e.g., David
Singh Grewal, The Laws of Capitalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 626, 658 (2014) (suggesting a
“return to Hale-style legal realism in the analysis of public institutions and ‘private’ law”);
Jamee K. Moudud, Distributional Struggles Always Operate Under the Background Laws That
Determine Property, Contracts, and Torts, in Eleven Things They Don’t Tell You About Law &
Economics: An Informal Introduction to Political Economy and Law, 37 LAW & INEQ. 97, 121
(2019) (relying on Robert Hale and other Legal Realists); K. Sabeel Rahman, Domination,
Democracy, and Constitutional Political Economy in the New Gilded Age: Towards A Fourth
Wave of Legal Realism?, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1329–31 (2016) (drawing on the insights of
Legal Realism to challenge the neo-Lochnerian turn in politics and law). For a good recent
piece applying an analysis influenced by Legal Realism to employment law, see Brishen
Rogers, Beyond Automation: The Law and Political Economy of Workplace Technological
Change 6 (Roosevelt Inst. Working Paper, 2019), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/07/RI_Beyond-Automation_Working-Paper.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/
6YUH-WAV5.
8
See infra text accompanying notes 23–74.
9
See infra text accompanying notes 75–200.
10
See infra text accompanying notes 201–359.
11
See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, NONFARM BUSINESS SECTOR: LABOR SHARE
(PRS85006173) (Mar. 5, 2020), https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PRS85006173, archived at
https://perma.cc/57YW-5S7N. For an instructive discussion of the appropriate methodology
for measuring the labor share of income, see Josh Bivens, The Fed Shouldn’t Give Up on
Restoring Labor’s Share of Income—And Measure it Correctly, ECON. POL’Y INST.: WORKING
ECON. BLOG (Jan. 30, 2019),
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profits [capital]” has “increase[d] inequality,” but we have also
experienced a substantial increase in inequality “within labor’s share,
between compensation to high earners relative to low earners.”12 There is
good reason to believe that these trends have resulted, in large part, from
imbalances in bargaining power within the economy.13 Ordinary workers
lack significant bargaining power because they face “asymmetric
vulnerability” vis-à-vis their employers: they need their employer more than
their employer needs them.14 Our nation’s long decline in unionization has
been associated with significant wage losses, as increasing numbers of
workers lack the boost in bargaining power that comes from standing
together.15 Those “high earners” who have done especially well are
disproportionately the top managers “who have high bargaining power to set
their own remuneration.”16 And although unemployment rates have dropped
significantly since the end of the Great Recession, many of those who are
employed can find only “precarious work”—low-paid work that may be
temporary, lacks job security, may lack consistent scheduling, and is often
not eligible for employment benefits or workplace protections.17
The legal developments I discuss in this Article directly undermine the
very sources of law that seek to rectify imbalances in bargaining power.18
https://www.epi.org/blog/the-fed-shouldnt-give-up-on-restoring-labors-share-of-income-andmeasure-it-correctly/, archived at https://perma.cc/C2XE-6E2L.
12
Hiba Hafiz, Economic Analysis of Labor Regulation, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 1115, 1177
(2017).
13
ANTHONY B. ATKINSON, INEQUALITY: WHAT CAN BE DONE? 147 (2015) (“To a
considerable degree the market outcome is currently the result of the bargaining power of
different participants.”).
14
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 MICH. L. REV. 225,
238 (2013). For a good canvass of the reasons for this imbalance in power, see James Gray
Pope, Contract, Race, and Freedom of Labor in the Constitutional Law of “Involuntary
Servitude”, 119 YALE L.J. 1474, 1554–56 (2010).
15
See JAKE ROSENFELD, PATRICK DENISE & JENNIFER LAIRD, ECON. POL’Y INST., UNION
DECLINE LOWERS WAGES OF NONUNION WORKERS 5 (2016), https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/
112811.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/LX8A-J2ML (“Unions, especially in industries and
regions where they are strong, help boost the wages of all workers by establishing pay and
benefit standards that many nonunion firms adopt. But this union boost to nonunion pay has
weakened as the share of private-sector workers in a union has fallen from 1 in 3 in the 1950s
to about 1 in 20 today.”). On the boost in bargaining power afforded by unions, see
ATKINSON, supra note 13, at 128–31; JAKE ROSENFELD, WHAT UNIONS NO LONGER DO 68
(2014).
16
Hafiz, supra note 12, at 1177.
17
Nicola Kountouris, The Legal Determinants of Precariousness in Personal Work
Relations: A European Perspective, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 21, 23–24 (2012).
18
Duncan Kennedy argues that the notion of unequal bargaining power provides, at best, a
haphazard basis for identifying the circumstances in which private law rules should aim at
redistribution; he sees that notion as primarily serving an ideological function in defending the
liberal contract regime. See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in
Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining
Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 614–24 (1982). In this Article, I make no effort to resolve the
empirical questions regarding the effects of minimum wage and collective bargaining laws.
For my purposes, it is enough to note that the declining labor share of income suggests that
workers in general are systematically less able than employers to realize the surplus the two
sides receive from contracting with each other, and that there are plausible arguments that

R
R
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Epic Systems made it harder to enforce the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), the federal minimum wage law. It also rested on a narrow
understanding of the protections for concerted employee action under the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Janus directly weakened the power
of labor unions. More generally, the view of worker choice that underlies
these decisions also underlies many of the prevailing tests governing which
workers count as “employees”—tests that enable employers in many cases
to effectively exempt themselves from the NLRA and wage and hour laws,
as well as other workplace protections.19 That doctrine has directly enabled
the recent growth of precarious work.20
Of course, labor and employment law does not simply aim to rectify
imbalances of bargaining power. It also seeks to achieve workplace equality
along a variety of dimensions.21 The developments I discuss in this Article
undermine the equality goal as well. Epic Systems made it more difficult for
workers to bring class action challenges to workplace discrimination; Hobby
Lobby undermined the equality interests of women workers. And the view
of worker choice that underlies these decisions also bolsters the at-will rule,
which has imposed both practical and doctrinal limits on the effectiveness of
all protections for workers.22 The trends I highlight in this piece thus are
important for understanding both Supreme Court doctrine and the future of
employment protections in the United States.

these laws help to rectify that situation. For discussion of labor law, see sources cited supra
note 15. For discussion of wage and hour law, see, e.g., Arindrajit Dube, Minimum Wages and
the Distribution of Family Income (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 25240,
2018), http://www.nber.org/papers/w25240, archived at https://perma.cc/274Y-K55X. Note
that wage and hour laws could help rectify these bargaining-power imbalances both directly
(by mandating that pay not fall below a certain rate) and indirectly (by helping to set societal
expectations about what is a fair wage). See Mark G. Kelman, Progressive Vacuums, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 975, 986 (1996); see generally ATKINSON, supra note 13, at 90 (“The division of the
surplus—and hence the wage—is influenced by the relative bargaining power of the two
parties, but there is room for other factors to enter the determination of pay, including appeal
to norms of equitable payment, which may in turn be embodied in custom and practice.”).
19
See infra text accompanying notes 201–48.
20
See, e.g., Veena B. Dubal, The Drive to Precarity: A Political History of Work,
Regulation, & Labor Advocacy in San Francisco’s Taxi & Uber Economies, 38 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 73, 76 (2017).
21
See, e.g., Aditi Bagchi, The Myth of Equality in the Employment Relation, 2009 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 579 (2009) (arguing that status inequality, and not inequality of bargaining power,
is what justifies intervention in the employment relationship); Bagenstos, supra note 14
(arguing that much of employment law is justified as promoting social equality); Noah D.
Zatz, Discrimination and Labour Law: Locating the Market in Maldistribution and
Subordination, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LABOUR LAW 156, 161 (Hugh Collins,
Gillian Lester & Virginia Mantouvalou, eds., 2019) (“The emphasis on unequal bargaining
power suggests that so long as we get the power right, employment bargains would be
unproblematic in principle. This, however, necessarily abandons the notion that markets in
human labour pose a particular problem above and beyond those afflicting markets in
general.”).
22
See infra text accompanying notes 248–349.

R
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I. CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CHOICE IN THE ROBERTS COURT’S LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT LAW JURISPRUDENCE
The Roberts Court’s decisions on workplace arbitration, union agency
fees, and the ACA’s contraception mandate have been extremely controversial. Although I cite some of the leading critiques of these cases in the footnotes below, it is not my goal to add to or rehash that controversy. Rather, I
aim to draw out a theme that appears in all of these cases—the theme of
employee and employer choice. Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in
Epic Systems brought this theme to the surface of the arbitration cases,23 but
prior scholarship has failed to focus on it or to appreciate the degree to
which it appears across all three sets of cases.
As I show in this part, the Court’s decisions in these cases invoke very
different visions of choice. In the arbitration cases, the Court treats both
workers and employers as free choosers. If they each sign onto an arbitration agreement, that is a choice that both sides freely made—even if the
employer drafted the agreement and imposed it on the worker as a take-itor-leave it condition of keeping a job.24 In Janus, by contrast, the Court
treats an agency fee as a form of compulsion—even though workers can
avoid the fee, just as they can avoid an arbitration agreement they do not
like, simply by seeking another job. And in Hobby Lobby, the Court treats
the contraception mandate as coercive, even though an individual with religious scruples could have avoided its application either by (a) choosing to
make money in a way that did not involve hiring employees or (b) hiring
employees, but doing so without hiding behind the corporate form.
My point here is not to criticize the bottom-line holdings of any of these
cases or to argue that they are inconsistent with each other. Each set of
cases implicates different doctrinal questions, and one can reasonably argue
that all of them are rightly decided, all are wrongly decided, or some are
right and some are wrong.25 My point here is the limited one of showing that
ideas about employer and employee choice are central to each of these
cases—and that the Court employs multiple inconsistent visions of choice.

23

For workers striving to gain from their employers decent terms and conditions of
employment, there is strength in numbers. A single employee, Congress understood,
is disarmed in dealing with an employer. The Court today subordinates employeeprotective labor legislation to the Arbitration Act. In so doing, the Court forgets the
labor market imbalance that gave rise to the NLGA and the NLRA, and ignores the
destructive consequences of diminishing the right of employees to band together in
confronting an employer.
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1633 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
24
See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1415–16 (2019); Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct.
at 1619, 1621.
25
Cards on the table: I disagree with the holdings in each of these cases.
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A. Employers and Workers as Free Choosers: Epic Systems
and Lamps Plus
Epic Systems and Lamps Plus involved arbitration agreements between
employers and their workers—and, in particular, whether those agreements
properly deprived the workers of the option to bring claims against their
employers on a class or collective basis. In Epic Systems, the Court had to
decide whether an arbitration agreement that required workers to waive their
rights to bring class or collective actions violated Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act.26 (Section 7 guarantees employees the right to engage
in “concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”27) Lamps Plus called on the Court to decide whether
an employment arbitration agreement permitted class arbitration when its
terms were ambiguous on the question.28
In each case, the Court treated the arbitration agreement as a bargain
that both the workers and their employers freely chose. Justice Gorsuch’s
opinion for the Court in Epic Systems makes that premise evident from its
very first two sentences, which frame the question presented: “Should employees and employers be allowed to agree that any disputes between them
will be resolved through one-on-one arbitration? Or should employees always be permitted to bring their claims in class or collective actions, no
matter what they agreed with their employers?”29 As Charlotte Garden
notes, “[t]he extent to which this question echoes the Lochner-era Court’s
assumptions about individual workers’ supposed freedom of contract is
breathtaking.”30
But the free-choice language did not stop with the first two sentences of
the majority opinion. In explaining why the Court’s prior decisions enforcing class action waivers fully applied to the cases now before it, the opinion
described the workers and their employers as having chosen to forgo the
class action device: “The parties before us contracted for arbitration. They
proceeded to specify the rules that would govern their arbitrations, indicating
their intention to use individualized rather than class or collective action
procedures.”31 “[T]his much,” the Court said, “the Arbitration Act seems
to protect pretty absolutely.”32 The Court explained, “Not only did Congress require courts to respect and enforce agreements to arbitrate; it also

26

See Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1619.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2018).
See Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1412.
29
Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1619.
30
Charlotte Garden, Epic Systems v. Lewis: The Return of Freedom of Contract in Work
Law?, 2 AM. CONST. SOC’Y SUP. CT. REV. 137, 159 (2018).
31
Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1621.
32
Id.
27
28
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specifically directed them to respect and enforce the parties’ chosen arbitration procedures.”33
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg questioned whether the arbitration agreements, with their accompanying class action waivers, were “genuinely bilateral.”34 Two of the employers before the Court had imposed the agreements
by emailing them to incumbent employees.35 In each instance, the email
provided that “employees’ continued employment would indicate their assent to the agreement’s terms.”36 Justice Ginsburg argued that the NLRA
and the Norris-LaGuardia Act rested on the premise that workers do not
have true freedom of contract if they are forced to make individual deals
with their employers: “For workers striving to gain from their employers
decent terms and conditions of employment, there is strength in numbers. A
single employee, Congress understood, is disarmed in dealing with an employer.”37 Justice Ginsburg concluded that collective litigation was a protected form of “concerted activit[y] . . . for . . . mutual aid or protection”
under Section 7 of the NLRA.38 And she concluded that an arbitration
agreement requiring a worker to waive the right to engage in that activity
violated Section 7. “The law could hardly be otherwise: Employees’ rights
to band together to meet their employers’ superior strength would be worth
precious little if employers could condition employment on workers signing
away those rights.”39
The Epic Systems majority apparently saw no need to respond directly
to Justice Ginsburg’s argument that the class action waivers were not an exercise of free employee choice. The majority followed precedent, which had
held that (a) the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) makes arbitration agreements
enforceable in the employment context;40 and (b) the FAA preempts state
law rules that prohibit class action waivers.41 And the majority concluded
that joining together to pursue a claim in court is not the sort of “concerted
activit[y]” the NLRA protects.42 But the prior cases on which the Court
relied rested on the premise that the arbitral agreement reflects a choice the
parties made.43 Indeed, the Epic Systems Court specifically described the
33

Id.
Id. at 1636 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 1633.
38
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2018).
39
Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
40
See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001).
41
See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341 (2011).
42
See Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1625–26. Every piece of the majority’s argument is highly
contestable, to say the least. For apt criticism of that argument, see Garden, supra note 30.
43
See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 233 (2013); Concepcion,
563 U.S. at 351. See generally Michael Selmi, Supreme Court Term 2017-18: The Umpires
Play Ball, 22 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 195, 217–18 (2018) (“The Supreme Court fell in love
with arbitration agreements in the 1980s when courts started to view such agreements as a way
to reduce clogged federal dockets, and treating the agreements as voluntary has played an
essential role in its jurisprudence.”).
34

R
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“essential insight” of those prior cases as follows: “courts may not allow a
contract defense to reshape traditional individualized arbitration by mandating classwide arbitration procedures without the parties’ consent.”44
Where the Court’s premise of free worker choice lay in the background
of Epic Systems, it was central to the reasoning in Lamps Plus. The lower
courts had held that, where an arbitration agreement was ambiguous regarding whether it authorized class arbitration, the parties could proceed on a
class basis.45 Those courts applied the general principle of contra proferentem to interpret the ambiguity against the employer, who had drafted the
contract.46 But the Supreme Court reversed.47
The Court recognized (albeit grumpily) that contra proferentem was a
general state law contract principle, one not targeted at arbitration.48 It nevertheless held that applying that principle to permit class arbitration would
“ ‘stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives’ of the FAA.”49
In particular, the Court held, applying contra proferentem would undermine “a ‘rule[] of fundamental importance’ under the FAA, namely, that
arbitration ‘is a matter of consent, not coercion.’” 50 The Court explained
that “‘[t]he first principle that underscores all of our arbitration decisions’ is
that ‘[a]rbitration is strictly a matter of consent.’” 51 It continued:
Consent is essential under the FAA because arbitrators wield only
the authority they are given. That is, they derive their “powers
from the parties’ agreement to forgo the legal process and submit
their disputes to private dispute resolution.” Parties may generally
shape such agreements to their liking by specifying with whom
they will arbitrate, the issues subject to arbitration, the rules by
which they will arbitrate, and the arbitrators who will resolve their
disputes. Whatever they settle on, the task for courts and arbitrators at bottom remains the same: “to give effect to the intent of the
parties.”52
Because class arbitration is different than ordinary arbitration, the Court
found it doubtful that parties entering into an arbitration agreement would
have intended to permit class proceedings absent some provision in the
agreement making that clear.53 And the Court concluded that using the prin44

Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1623.
See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1413 (2019).
46
See id.
47
See id. at 1419.
48
Id. at 1417.
49
Id. at 1415 (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011).
50
Id. (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681 (2010)).
51
Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1415 (quoting Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287,
299 (2010)).
52
Id. at 1416 (citations omitted).
53
See id.
45
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ciple of contra proferentem to fill the gap would be inconsistent with the
principle of consent. That principle, the Court determined, does not seek to
identify the intent of the parties; rather, it “provides a default rule based on
public policy considerations.”54 Applying contra proferentem thus committed a basic sin under the Court’s arbitration cases: it “rel[ied] on state contract principles to ‘reshape traditional individualized arbitration by
mandating classwide arbitration procedures without the parties’ consent.’” 55
Dissenting in Lamps Plus, Justice Ginsburg once again criticized the
majority’s premise that workers are in a position to exercise free choice over
the terms of arbitration agreements. She described the Court as having
“treacherously . . . strayed from the principle that ‘arbitration is a matter of
consent, not coercion.’” 56 Emphasizing again the “‘Hobson’s choice’ employees face: ‘accept arbitration on their employer’s terms or give up their
jobs,’” Justice Ginsburg described the Court’s invocation of the principle of
consent as “iron[ic].”57 As in Epic Systems, the majority offered no substantive response to her argument about unequal bargaining power.58 That
employees had agreed to arbitration, as a take-it-or-leave-it condition of
keeping their jobs, was sufficient “consent” to justify depriving them of the
power to pursue their grievances on a class basis.59
Both Epic Systems and Lamps Plus, then, rested crucially on the premise that the workers and employers had freely chosen the arbitration agreements at issue. That was so even though the Court recognized that the
employer had drafted the arbitration agreements in each case and imposed
them on workers as a condition of continued employment. Apparently, because the workers could refuse the offer and look for work elsewhere, their
acceptance of the employers’ terms constituted adequate “consent.”
That, of course, is the same understanding of worker choice that the
Court articulated during its Lochner-era cases. For example, in Coppage v.
Kansas, which invalidated a state law prohibiting yellow-dog contracts, the
Court explained that the offer of such a contract left the worker “free to
exercise a voluntary choice.”60 The Court said that the worker, faced with
an employer’s offer of employment on the condition that he never join a
union, “is free to decline the employment on those terms, just as the em-

54

Id. at 1417.
Id. at 1418 (quoting Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623 (2018)).
56
Id. at 1420 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l
Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681 (2010)).
57
Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1421.
58
The majority noted that contra proferentem finds its justification in “equitable considerations about the parties’ relative bargaining strength,” id. at 1417 (majority opinion), but its
opinion said nothing about the bargaining power of the parties in the case before it.
59
Id. at 1416–17.
60
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 9 (1915). For an argument that workplace arbitration
agreements are this generation’s yellow-dog contracts, see generally Katherine Van Wezel
Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of
the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996).
55
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ployer may decline to offer employment on any other; for ‘It takes two to
make a bargain.’” 61
B. Workers as Constrained: Janus
In Epic Systems and Lamps Plus, the Roberts Court determined that a
term imposed as a condition of continued employment nonetheless reflected
workers’ choice because they always have the option to seek employment
elsewhere. But the Roberts Court has not consistently taken that approach to
worker consent. In Janus v. AFSCME, the Court treated employees as having no choice to resist paying agency fees to the union that represented them,
even though they—just like the workers in the arbitration cases—could have
avoided the fees simply by finding work elsewhere.
As in Epic Systems, the first two lines of the Court’s opinion in Janus
highlight the centrality of choice and compulsion to the decision:
Under Illinois law, public employees are forced to subsidize a
union, even if they choose not to join and strongly object to the
positions the union takes in collective bargaining and related activities. We conclude that this arrangement violates the free speech
rights of nonmembers by compelling them to subsidize private
speech on matters of substantial public concern.62
Later, when explaining the First Amendment principles that formed the
foundation for its conclusion, the Court highlighted the harms that occur
“[w]hen speech is compelled” and individuals are thus “coerced into betraying their convictions.”63 The Court concluded that “[c]ompelling a person to subsidize the speech of other private speakers raises similar First
Amendment concerns.”64
What does it mean to say that the workers in Janus were “forced,”
“compelled,” or “coerced” to subsidize a union? It means simply that those
workers had to choose between paying the agency fee and finding another
job. But the union could easily respond that “no one is compelled to accept

61
Coppage, 236 U.S. at 21. The leading modern exponent of this view is Richard Epstein.
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal
Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1371–72 (1983).
62
Janus v. AFSCME Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2459–60 (2018). The opening passages
of the opinions leading up to Janus, also written by Justice Alito, similarly emphasized the
Court’s premise that the collection of agency fees constituted the compulsion of workers. Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616, 620 (2014) (“This case presents the question whether the First
Amendment permits a State to compel personal care providers to subsidize speech on matters
of public concern by a union that they do not wish to join or support.”); Knox v. SEIU Local
1000, 567 U.S. 298, 302 (2012) (“In this case, we decide whether the First Amendment allows
a public-sector union to require objecting nonmembers to pay a special fee for the purpose of
financing the union’s political and ideological activities.”).
63
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464.
64
Id.
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a job from an employer who has agreed to an agency-shop arrangement.”65
The workers in Epic Systems and Lamps Plus faced the same structural
choice—accept employment terms they might not want or find another job.
Yet the Court in those cases concluded that the workers “chose,” “agreed
to,” or “consented to” the arbitration clauses that banned class actions.
In Janus, the Court framed the relevant situation narrowly: it took the
employment relationship for granted and noted that, in the context of that
relationship, the employer had imposed an employment term that workers
could not avoid. In Epic Systems and Lamps Plus, the Court framed the
situation more broadly: if workers did not like a term the employer sought to
impose, they could avoid it by eschewing an employment relationship with
that employer.66
C. Employers as Constrained: Hobby Lobby
In the arbitration cases, the Roberts Court has treated workers’ choices as
free, even if they were made under threat of the denial of a job. In Janus, by
contrast, the Court stated that the threat of job denial “compelled” and “coerced” workers to accept a condition of employment. And the Court applied
a Janus-like approach to coercion once again in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby—
though this time it was employers, rather than employees, whom it found to
be coerced.
The question in Hobby Lobby was whether the Affordable Care Act’s
“contraceptive mandate” violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA).67 The plaintiffs were closely held for-profit corporations owned by
people who had religious objections to paying for contraceptives that block
the implantation of fertilized ova.68 The government argued that the plaintiffs had no rights under RFRA, having chosen to operate as for-profit corporations to obtain limited liability and the other benefits that the state provides
to such corporations.69 For RFRA to apply to the operation of their business,
65
See Louis Michael Seidman, The Dale Problem: Property and Speech Under the Regulatory State, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1541, 1589 (2008); see Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Public Unions
Under First Amendment Fire, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1291, 1305 (2018) (“The bottom line is
that in choosing to work for the government in a unionized setting, petitioners have already
chosen association over non-association, as employees.”); Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800, 829
(2012) (“[I]f employees can choose to leave, or not to accept, a job covered by a union
security agreement and instead work in the non-union sector (or in a union job in one of the
twenty-three states where such clauses are illegal), the meaning of the claim that employees
are ‘compelled’ to pay dues to the union is not self-evident.”).
66
On the importance, and manipulability, of such framing choices in legal doctrine, see
generally Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 1311
(2002); Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 591, 600–16 (1981). On the particular connection between framing choices and determinations of consent, see Kelman, supra, at 614–16.
67
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 692 (2014).
68
See id. at 700–03.
69
See id. at 709–13.
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the government contended, the owners should have operated as a sole proprietorship rather than shielding themselves behind the separate legal personhood of a corporation.70 The Court, however, rejected that argument.71 It
noted that the government’s position “would put these merchants to a difficult choice: either give up the right to seek judicial protection of their religious liberty or forgo the benefits, available to their competitors, of operating
as corporations.”72 The Court concluded that Congress, in enacting RFRA,
would not have wanted to impose such a burden.73
Of course, the contraception mandate would not have applied to the
owners at all if they had not first made a choice to make their money by
operating a business that involved hiring employees. Just as the workers in
the arbitration cases and Janus could have avoided the impositions they challenged simply by finding work elsewhere, the business owners in Hobby
Lobby could have avoided the imposition they challenged by seeking other
ways of making a living. But the Court did not even consider whether that
choice rendered the contraception mandate voluntary—and, indeed, the government did not even make that argument.
The Court’s holding is understandable, if contestable, on its own
terms.74 But the crucial point for my purposes is the Court’s treatment of
choice and coercion. The only reason there was a question whether the contraception mandate and RFRA applied to the employers in Hobby Lobby is
that they made choices—a choice to earn their money by employing others,
and a further choice to shield themselves behind the corporate form in doing
so. Yet the Court did not treat those choices as being free ones. To the
contrary, because of the burden the employers would have had to assume if
they were to avoid the mandate, the Court concluded that the mandate was
coercive.75
II. THE ROBERTS COURT’S LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS
THE LEGAL REALIST CRITIQUE OF CHOICE AND CONSENT

AND

In Part I, I showed that the Roberts Court’s labor and employment law
decisions rest on different and conflicting understandings of free choice.
Sometimes, as in the arbitration cases, the Court envisions employers and
workers as operating free from constraint—even when employers impose
70

See id.
See id. at 691.
72
Id. at 706.
73
See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 706–09.
74
While Hobby Lobby was pending, but anticipating its holding, I suggested that the
Court’s decision would open the door to constitutional challenges to many applications of civil
rights laws. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accommodations Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 1238–40 (2014).
75
See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 726 (contrasting the contraception mandate with the facts
in cases where plaintiffs could not “identify any coercion directed at the practice or exercise of
their religious beliefs” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
71
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take-it-or-leave-it terms on workers as a condition of keeping their jobs.
Other times, as in Janus and Hobby Lobby, the Court envisions employers
and workers as coerced or compelled—even when they could avoid the impositions they challenge simply by seeking other work or remuneration.
But what does this have to do with Lochner? In this part, I draw the
connection. Lochner-era labor and employment cases, like the Roberts
Court’s recent cases, rested on contestable understandings of worker choice
and consent. As I showed above, the understanding of worker choice reflected in the recent arbitration cases is exactly the same as the one that
underlay the Lochner-era cases invalidating bans on yellow-dog contracts.76
Yet today, as in the Lochner era, the Court typically takes its understanding
of choice for granted. As a result, it neither surfaces nor defends the contestable normative basis for that understanding, nor does it explain why it employs different understandings of worker choice in different cases.
In the first half of the twentieth-century, various Legal Realist scholars
responded to Lochner-era jurisprudence by highlighting the same dynamics.
I begin this part by describing their critique.77 I then apply that critique to
the Court’s recent cases.
A. The Legal Realist Critique
The core of the Legal Realist critique of choice and consent is simply
stated: constraints on choice are everywhere. Those constraints arise in significant part as the result of legal rules that assign entitlements and structure
existing distributions. To talk about choice or consent as the driving principle of a legal regime is therefore to hide the way the law constructs the
distribution of wealth and sets the context for bargaining—and to hide the
considerations that actually underlie decisions to enforce or override particular choices.
76

See supra text accompanying notes 59–60.
In offering this description, I make no effort to describe what arguments or scholars
were “central” to Legal Realism, or what the “true” take-away of Legal Realism was. See
generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 169–92 (1992); cf., e.g., Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism
Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 470 n.6 (1988) (criticizing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT
YALE: 1927–1960 (1986) for focusing too heavily on the work of Jerome Frank, whom Singer
calls “a peripheral figure in legal realism,” as compared to “central figures” such as “Morris
and Felix Cohen, Robert Hale, Walter Wheeler Cook, Leon Green, and Karl Llewellyn”);
Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV.
267, 272 n.24, 26 (1997) (arguing that critical legal scholars have incorrectly treated Robert
Hale and Morris Cohen as key figures in Legal Realism). Whether or not that sort of inquiry is
coherent, it is not especially useful for my purposes—which are merely to highlight certain
analytical and critical tools, developed by some scholars in the early part of the Twentieth
Century, that shed light on current disputes in labor and employment law. Nor do I attempt,
like Hanoch Dagan, to make any broad-scale reconstruction of Realist ideas, though I do share
with Dagan the goal of “drawing out from the realist texts a vision of law that is currently
relevant—indeed, valuable”—rather than engaging in an exercise of intellectual history. Hanoch Dagan, The Realist Conception of Law, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 607, 609 (2007).
77
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The crucial figures in developing this critique were Robert Hale and
Morris Cohen, and the employment relationship was a key area of focus for
them. Hale, for example, argued that all employment contracts are the result
of coercion backed by law. Thanks to the law of property, individuals cannot simply take from others the food, shelter, or income they need to survive—nor can they take land, machinery, or other means of making a living.
These legal entitlements thus coerce those individuals into accepting contracts of employment. “If the non-owner works for anyone,” Hale argued,
“it is for the purpose of warding off the threat of at least one owner of
money to withhold that money from him (with the help of the law).”78 Because “the law which forbids [a non-owner] to produce with any of the
existing equipment, and the law which forbids him to eat any of the existing
food, will be lifted only in case he works for an employer,” it is “the law of
property which coerces people to work for factory owners.”79 Of course,
workers have coercive power, too, in the form of their legal right to withhold
their labor from their employer (at least to the extent that the law gives them
that right).80 Hale thus concluded that any contract for hire reflects the balance between the coercive power deployed on either side.81 “[I]n a sense
each party to the contract, by the threat to call on the government to enforce
his power over the liberty of the other, imposes the terms of the contract on
the other.”82
For Hale, then, to talk about “freedom of contract” in the sense of freedom from coercion was nonsensical. All contracts reflect the balance of coercion between the contracting parties. And because that coercion finds its
source in state power in the form of law, it is equally nonsensical to treat
existing contracts and distributions as a neutral baseline against which any
new government intervention is coercive. “Hale showed that government
regulations do not, as a conceptual matter, interject coercion into our world
but rather (re-)distribute the coercion that unavoidably inheres in any system
78
Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL.
SCI. Q. 470, 472 (1923).
79
Id. at 473; see also Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 603, 627 (1943) (“The employer’s power to induce people to work for him
depends largely on the fact that the law previously restricts the liberty of these people to
consume, while he has the power, through the payment of wages, to release them to some
extent from these restrictions.”).
80
Hale notes, for example, that the law may deprive workers of this coercive power to the
extent that it makes some strikes (collective refusals to work) illegal. See Hale, supra note 79,
at 607.
81
Hale, supra note 78, at 474; see also id. at 477 (“[T]he income of each person in the
community depends on the relative strength of his power of coercion, offensive and defensive.”); Hale, supra note 79, at 612 (“[A]ll money is paid, and all contracts are made, to avert
some kinds of threats.”).
82
Robert L. Hale, Law Making by Unofficial Minorities, 20 COLUM. L. REV. 451, 452
(1920); see also John P. Dawson, Economic Duress: An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L.
REV. 253, 266 (1947) (stating, in a piece inspired by Hale’s work, that “freedom of the ‘market’ was essentially a freedom of individuals and groups to coerce one another, with the power
to coerce reinforced by agencies of the state itself”).

R
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of private property.”83 The only real question is which forms of coercion, in
which circumstances, the law should support. And answering that question
requires resort to some concept beyond “coercion”—whether “actual power
of free initiative,”84 “sound reasons of economic policy,”85 or something
else.86
Cohen made a similar point: “[I]n enforcing contracts,” he said, “the
government does not merely allow two individuals to do what they have
found pleasant in their eyes.”87 Because enforcement “puts the machinery
of the law in the service of one party against the other,” the issues of when
and how the law should enforce contracts “are important questions of public
policy.”88 Like Hale, Cohen argued that, because of background economic
and social conditions, formal freedom of contract did not necessarily reflect
a truly free choice—“though men may be legally free to make whatever
contract they please, they are not actually or economically free.”89 Some
contracts result from one party “exploiting” the “dire need of their neighbors to make the latter agree to almost anything.”90 As with Hale, Cohen
found the source of this private coercive power in property law. Because the
law of property empowers me to exclude “my neighbor” from things that
may be “necessary to [his] life,” it “confers on me a power, limited but
real, to make him do what I want.”91
Canvassing an array of different situations in which the law deems parties to have entered into contracts even though “there is no negotiation, bar83
Ian Ayres, Discrediting the Free Market, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 273, 275 (1999); see Hale,
supra note 78, at 478 (“To take this control by law from the owner of the plant and to vest it in
public officials or in a guild or in a union organization elected by the workers would neither
add to nor subtract from the constraint which is exercised with the aid of the government. It
would merely transfer the constraining power to a different set of persons.”); see generally
BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE
FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 212 (1998) (“What proponents championed as laissez[-]faire turned out on closer inspection to be merely a different form of public meddling
with so-called private affairs.”); Justin Desautels-Stein, The Market as a Legal Concept, 60
BUFF. L. REV. 387, 466–67 (2012) (“In the real world, the actual function of laissez-faire was
shot through with coercive restrictions on individual freedom, restrictions ‘out of conformity
with any formula of “equal opportunity,” or of “preserving the equal rights of others.”’ In any
modern society, such restrictions were unavoidable, and the only question was when and how
to coerce whom, and where to direct the distribution of income and resources.”) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Hale, supra note 78, at 470).
84
Hale, supra note 78, at 478.
85
Hale, supra note 79, at 628.
86
Barbara Fried argues that Hale filled this in with a social-democratic form of Lockean
appropriation theory. See FRIED, supra note 83, at 110–11. Neil Duxbury argues that Hale
“simply believed that, by identifying the true nature of economic compulsion, and by realising
that it in fact exists where normally one sees a relationship of prima facie economic freedom,
legislators and judges may be able to take steps to reduce the accumulation of private governing power in the hands of an economically privileged few.” Neil Duxbury, Robert Hale
and the Economy of Legal Force, 53 MOD. L. REV. 421, 442 (1990).
87
Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 562 (1933).
88
Id.
89
Id. at 563.
90
Id.
91
Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12 (1927).
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gain, or genuinely voluntary agreement,” Cohen argued that voluntary
choice cannot be the sole basis for enforcing contracts.92 He gave special
attention to employment contracts, particularly in industrial enterprises.
“The working-man has no real power to negotiate or confer with the corporation as to the terms under which he will agree to work,” Cohen argued.93
Explicitly rejecting the notion of freedom of contract applied in Lochner and
Coppage, Cohen contended that “the element of consent on the part of the
employee may be a minor one in the relation of employment—a relation
much more aptly and realistically described by the old law as that between
master and servant.”94
As did Hale, Cohen emphasized the power that common-law rules of
property and contract enable private parties to exercise over other private
parties—a power he referred to as “sovereignty.”95 And because the rules
governing when to enforce agreements necessarily involve the state’s decision about how to deploy its sovereign power, the resolution to that question
must necessarily be a political one. “If, then, the law of contract confers
sovereignty on one party over another (by putting the state’s forces at the
disposal of the former), the question naturally arises: For what purposes and
under what circumstances shall that power be conferred?”96
The negative liberty of contract cannot provide a coherent basis for answering that question. Rather, Cohen argued, the state should take “care
that the power of the state be not used for unconscionable purposes, such as
helping those who exploit the dire need or weaknesses of their fellows.”97
Enforcing every bargain “would logically lead not to a maximum of individual liberty but to contracts of slavery, into which, experience shows, men
will ‘voluntarily’ enter under economic pressure . . . a pressure that is largely
conditioned by the laws of property.”98 Limiting the types of bargains the
state will enforce thus may be “necessary to assure real freedom.”99

92

Cohen, supra note 87, at 568–71.
Id. at 569; see also Cohen, supra note 91, at 12 (“[N]ot only is there actually little
freedom to bargain on the part of the steel worker or miner who needs a job, but in some cases
the medieval subject had as much power to bargain when he accepted the sovereignty of his
lord. Today I do not directly serve my landlord if I wish to live in the city with a roof over my
head, but I must work for others to pay him rent with which he obtains the personal services of
others. The money needed for purchasing things must for the vast majority be acquired by
hard labor and disagreeable service to those to whom the law has accorded dominion over the
things necessary for subsistence.”).
94
Cohen, supra note 87, at 569.
95
See id. at 586 (“The law of contract, then, through judges, sheriffs, or marshals puts the
sovereign power of the state at the disposal of one party to be exercised over the other party. It
thus grants a limited sovereignty to the former.”); Cohen, supra note 91, at 12; see also Louis
L. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201, 217 (1937).
96
Cohen, supra note 87, at 587; see also Cohen, supra note 91, at 14 (“[I]t is necessary
to apply to the law of property all those considerations of social ethics and enlightened public
policy which ought to be brought to the discussion of any just form of government.”).
97
Cohen, supra note 87, at 587.
98
Id.
99
Id.
93
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Although Cohen’s and Hale’s interventions were analytic in form, they
explicitly served a political and jurisprudential agenda of undermining Lochner-era understandings of freedom of contract.100 As Jedediah Purdy explains referring to Hale in particular—but in an analysis that applies to both
men—their work “showed the implausibility of simply blessing as ‘voluntary’ a labor contract resulting from the encounter of the worker’s very small
coercive power (the threat of withholding labor) with the very great coercive
power of the employer (the threat of withholding employment).”101 Joseph
Singer puts the same point slightly differently: “Property law thus limits
freedom of contract, since some people have more freedom of contract—
ability to obtain what they want on terms agreeable to them—than
others.”102
Coppage, which invalidated a state law banning yellow-dog contracts,103 was the key Lochner-era case. Justice Pitney’s opinion for the
Court recognized that the state may “properly exert its police power to prevent coercion on the part of employers towards employees, or vice versa.” 104
And he also recognized that Kansas had described the employer’s action—
demanding that workers agree, as a condition of continued employment, not
to join a union—as coercive.105 In particular, Justice Pitney noted the view,
expressed by the Kansas Supreme Court, that “employees, as a rule, are not
financially able to be as independent in making contracts for the sale of their
labor as are employers in making contracts of purchase thereof.”106 He
agreed that “wherever the right of private property exists, there must and
will be inequalities of fortune; and thus it naturally happens that parties negotiating about a contract are not equally unhampered by circumstances.”107
Each party thus will be “inevitably more or less influenced by the question
whether he has much property, or little, or none.”108
But, Justice Pitney concluded, this sort of pressure or influence cannot
count as coercion “in truth,”109 lest the entire system of property and contract unravel. He found it “self-evident that, unless all things are held in
100
See Warren J. Samuels, The Economy as a System of Power and Its Legal Bases: The
Legal Economics of Robert Lee Hale, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 261, 273 (1973) (showing that
Hale offered Coercion and Distribution in direct response to Coppage); Duncan Kennedy,
From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s “Consideration and
Form”, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 124 (2000) (arguing that “a major practical conclusion that
was made to follow from” analyses like those of Hale and Cohen “was that the U.S. Supreme
Court should not strike down progressive legislation on the grounds that it interfered with a
right of free contract guaranteed by the 14th Amendment”).
101
Jedediah Purdy, People as Resources: Recruitment and Reciprocity in the FreedomPromoting Approach to Property, 56 DUKE L.J. 1047, 1097 (2007).
102
Singer, supra note 77, at 490.
103
See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915).
104
Id. at 15.
105
Id. at 8.
106
Id. at 17 (internal quotations omitted).
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Coppage, 236 U.S. at 16.
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common, some persons must have more property than others.”110 He thus
reasoned that “it is from the nature of things impossible to uphold freedom
of contract and the right of private property without at the same time recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result
of the exercise of those rights.”111
Coppage’s narrow understanding of coercion thus rested on a protoNozickian understanding that any distribution that results from free exchange is just.112 Precisely because that distribution is just, Justice Pitney
argued, it cannot be deemed to undermine the freedom of the transactions
that follow.113 “Unless a private party had violated the market ground rules
of competency, fraud, and duress,” Pitney thus “viewed coercion as residing
exclusively in affirmative state action.”114
Hale and Cohen’s analysis fatally undermined Pitney’s argument, because it demonstrated that “the ‘inequalities of fortune’ by which individuals
are ‘inevitably more or less influenced’ are the result of state power.”115 It is
the state, through rules of property and contract law, that gives market actors
the power to coerce each other. Thus, the effort to say that limitations imposed by state law represent coercion “in truth,” while limitations imposed
by private parties do not, necessarily unravels. All of these limitations rest
on state law in the end.116 Just “because courts can do nothing to revise the
underlying pattern of market relationships,” it did not follow that “courts
should, in the name of liberty and equality, thwart [legislative] attempts to
equalize the economic liberty of the weak.”117
To say that coercion is everywhere, of course, doesn’t mean that existing arrangements are improper, illegitimate, or unjustified. Hale emphasized that “to call an act coercive is not by any means to condemn it.”118
Similarly, Cohen wrote that “the recognition of private property as a form of
sovereignty is not in itself an argument against it.”119 As Fried puts it,
“[n]othing logically followed” from the Legal Realist critique, “beyond the
all-important conclusion . . . that most legal questions were questions of
110

Id. at 17.
Id.
112
See Epstein, supra note 61, at 1408. For Nozick’s classic “Wilt Chamberlain” example
of free exchange leading to (justifiable) inequality, see ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE,
AND UTOPIA 160–64 (1974).
113
Although this is not a logically necessary implication of his theory that distributions
resulting from free exchange are just, it is notable that in his work on coercion Nozick, too,
“recognizes neither social or structural coercion, nor the possibility that coercion might be the
unconscious byproduct of human action primarily directed at other ends, nor the possibility
that one might ‘coerce’ by exploiting limitations on the freedom of others not of one’s own
making.” Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1449
(1989) (footnote omitted).
114
Gary Peller, Privilege, 104 GEO. L.J. 883, 897 (2016).
115
Id. at 890 (footnotes omitted; quoting Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915)).
116
See id. at 897.
117
Hale, supra note 79, at 625.
118
Hale, supra note 78, at 471.
119
Cohen, supra note 91, at 14.
111
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policy for the legislatures, not matters of constitutional rights for the
courts.”120 But the “skeptical, deconstructive analysis” of Hale and Cohen’s
critique “offered little guidance” in deciding how to answer those
questions.121
The point of Hale and Cohen’s interventions, however, was not to resolve the questions of what forms the government’s actions to structure and
regulate the market should take. Those are questions that “can be answered
only by reference to moral and policy considerations.”122 Rather, the point
was to demonstrate that concepts like coercion, consent, private property,
and free contract cannot resolve them. Acting as if these concepts can resolve cases merely hides the moral and policy judgments that are being
made offstage.123 These, notably, include judgments about which inequalities are “so severe, and the resulting bargains so unfair, that they represent
illegitimate impositions of power” and thus should not be understood as
“free bargains.”124
When it interred the Lochner Era and began upholding New Deal legislation, the Supreme Court relied on arguments that resonated with the Legal
Realist critique of freedom of contract. Hale himself played a significant
role in developing one key New Deal statute—the National Labor Relations
Act. In the Senate hearings on the bill, he “voiced quintessential realist
arguments about the pervasiveness of relations of power and coercion in the
labor market, which were echoed throughout [Senator] Wagner’s own rhetorical appeals for the Act’s passage.”125 Upholding the statute in NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,126 Chief Justice Hughes’ opinion for the Court
embraced those arguments. Hughes explained that “a single employee was
helpless in dealing with an employer,” that “he was dependent ordinarily on
his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family,” that “if the employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless
unable to leave the employ and resist arbitrary and unfair treatment,” and

120

FRIED, supra note 83, at 210.
Id.
122
Singer, supra note 77, at 491; see Robert W. Gordon, Using History in Teaching Contracts: The Case of Britton v. Turner, 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 423, 432–33 (2004) (“There may be
valid reasons for distinguishing the different kinds of threats, but as Hale and Dawson memorably pointed out, the reasons cannot be that the parties under threats of force or breach of preexisting contracts are coerced and the workers under threat of firing/not hiring are free. All are
making a rational choice of the less disagreeable alternative. The reasons some threats are held
improper and others permitted must be moral, economic and political reasons independent of
the degree of coercion.”).
123
For the classic general statement of the point, by Morris Cohen’s son, see generally
Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
809 (1935).
124
Singer, supra note 77, at 490.
125
Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1409 n.124 (1993).
126
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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that joining together was therefore “essential to give laborers opportunity to
deal on an equality with their employer.”127
Upholding a minimum wage for women in West Coast Hotel Company
v. Parrish,128 Chief Justice Hughes similarly emphasized the measure’s role
in preventing the “exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal
position with respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively defenceless
against the denial of a living wage.”129 And just as Hale and Cohen dissolved the boundaries between public and private, Hughes highlighted the
way the seemingly private conduct of employers in paying starvation wages
imposed a burden on the public fisc: “What these workers lose in wages the
taxpayers are called upon to pay. The bare cost of living must be met.”130
In a Haleian analytic move, Hughes said that allowing employers to pay
their workers low wages would thus be “a subsidy for unconscionable
employers.”131
B. The Critique Applied to the Roberts Court
With the Legal Realist critique in mind, it is easy to see how the recent
Roberts Court decisions replicate the Lochner Era. It is not that the Roberts
Court has invalidated labor and employment statutes on substantive due process grounds.132 Instead, the Roberts Court has replicated the Lochner Era
by relying on an undefended—and often unarticulated—notion of free contract in the employment context. The Court’s notion of free contract persistently fails to take account of the ways in which workers’ choices are
constrained by the circumstances surrounding the employment relationship.
Concomitantly, it persistently fails to take account of the way that unionization and regulation can rectify bargaining power imbalances and help pro-

127

Id. at 33.
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
129
Id. at 399.
130
Id.
131
Id. See generally Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783, 818 (2003) (“In effect, the
Court portrayed the minimum wage law as reducing rather than creating moral hazard, reasoning that the law internalized costs that employers had wrongly spread to society.”); Cass R.
Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 880–81 (1987) (“The Court’s claim is
that the failure to impose a minimum wage is not nonintervention at all but simply another
form of action—a decision to rely on traditional market mechanisms, within the common law
framework, as the basis for regulation.”).
132
Janus, of course, has overtones of that sort of Lochnerism, as do Roberts Court decisions protecting the First Amendment rights of businesses. See supra note 5. In my own
work, I have argued that these developments represent a strategic effort to reframe libertarian
claims from the property-and-contract frame, which “was politically vulnerable in a postLochner world,” to a First Amendment frame, which was “more politically congenial.”
Bagenstos, supra note 74, at 1233. The Court’s holding that the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate exceeded congressional power under the Commerce Clause can be understood as
another example of strategic reframing of Lochnerism. See generally Jamal Greene, What the
New Deal Settled, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 265 (2012).
128

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\55-2\HLC201.txt

430

unknown

Seq: 22

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

23-SEP-20

14:09

[Vol. 55

vide workers with “real freedom”133 or the “actual power of free
initiative.”134
1. The Arbitration Cases
The point is most obvious in Lamps Plus. In rejecting class arbitration,
the Court relied on what it called the “first principle” of arbitration jurisprudence, “that arbitration is a matter of consent, not coercion.”135 But the very
question at issue was precisely what the employer and employee had consented to. The employer’s contract was ambiguous regarding whether it
would permit arbitration on a class basis. In determining what the parties
consented to, the employee argued, the courts should apply the general, preexisting principle of contra proferentem.136 It is a perfectly reasonable interpretation of the concept of consent to say that a party consents to contractual
terms supplied by well-understood background principles of law.137
Rejecting that argument, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court
argued that the contra proferentem doctrine does not promote consent because it is not designed to identify the linguistic meaning of a term: “Unlike
contract rules that help to interpret the meaning of a term, and thereby uncover the intent of the parties, contra proferentem is by definition triggered
only after a court determines that it cannot discern the intent of the parties.”138 Rather than seeking to determine what the parties consented to,
Roberts argued, that doctrine is “based on public policy factors, primarily
equitable considerations about the parties’ relative bargaining strength.”139
There are several flaws in Chief Justice Roberts’s analysis. First,
whatever the reason for the contra proferentem doctrine, it is a background
principle of long standing.140 Roberts never explained why the employer in
Lamps Plus—a large corporation that acted with the aid of counsel—should
not be understood as having consented to the application of that doctrine
when it drafted its arbitration contract. As Justice Kagan noted in her dis133

Cohen, supra note 87, at 587.
Hale, supra note 78, at 478.
135
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1415 (2019) (internal quotations omitted).
136
See id. at 1417.
137
See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 866 (1992) (“[W]hen the transaction costs of discovering and
contracting around the default rules are sufficiently low, a party’s consent to be legally bound
coupled with silence on the issue in question may well constitute consent to the imposition of
the particular default rule that is in existence in the relevant legal system.”); David Charny,
Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV.
1815, 1820 (1991) (“[O]nce the parties know that the law will supply the term, they take that
into account when calculating the benefits of drafting an express term.”).
138
Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1417.
139
Id. It is not clear that Roberts was right about this.
140
See id. (acknowledging that “the rule enjoys a place in every hornbook and treatise on
contracts”); Tal Kastner & Ethan J. Leib, Contract Creep, 107 GEO. L.J. 1277, 1298 (2019)
(“ Contra proferentem is an admittedly old principle of contract construction that may have
already been in the domain of ‘general contract law’ since Roman times.”).
134
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sent, “Lamps Plus, knowing about the anti-drafter rule, still chose not to
include a term prohibiting class arbitration.”141
Second, Chief Justice Roberts’s critique of the application of contra
proferentem could be applied just as well—if not even more strongly—to
his own analysis. There was no term in the Lamps Plus arbitration agreement that forbade class proceedings.142 Indeed, although the language of the
agreement did not definitively resolve the issue one way or the other, Justice
Kagan made a strong case that the language was most plausibly read to permit both individual and class arbitration.143 If the employer did not consent
to an arbitration agreement that permitted class proceedings, the employee
certainly did not consent to an agreement that banned class proceedings.
The “first principle” that “arbitration is strictly a matter of consent,”144 is
simply not sufficient to tell us whether to allow class arbitration here.
The majority’s decision to read the contract to bar class arbitration
rested, not on an effort to identify the intent of the parties, but on the Court’s
own policy of removing obstacles to individual arbitration. Relying on the
Court’s prior cases that had enforced arbitration contracts that expressly
banned class proceedings, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that class arbitration “sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—
and makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment.”145 That policy has nothing more to do
with consent than does the policy of contra proferentem.
To be sure, Chief Justice Roberts attempted to connect the Court’s policy concern to (actual or hypothetical) consent. Given the differences between individual and class arbitration, he argued, the mere fact that a person
consented to individual arbitration does not suggest that the person consented or would have consented to class arbitration. Contractual ambiguity,
he concluded, “does not provide a sufficient basis to conclude that parties to
an arbitration agreement agreed to ‘sacrifice[ ] the principal advantage of
arbitration.’” 146
But this analysis of consent focuses entirely on the employer’s perspective. Perhaps an employer would not have agreed to an ambiguous arbitration agreement if it understood that the ambiguity would be read to permit
class proceedings. From the employee’s perspective, however, things look
different. In the abstract, it seems just as plausible that workers would not
have agreed to a complex arbitration agreement unless they understood that
ambiguities in that agreement would be interpreted against the drafter. That,
after all, is one of the justifications scholars have offered for the contra
141

Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1434 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1428–29 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
143
See id.
144
Id. at 1415 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
145
Id. at 1416 (internal quotation marks omitted; quoting AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011)).
146
Id. (quoting Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 348).
142
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proferentem rule. Eric Posner, for example, suggests that the contra proferentem rule promotes consent:
The drafter has an advantage: she can sneak in favorable language.
But as a consequence, the drafter may have trouble persuading the
nondrafter to consent to a contract. A natural solution to this problem is to agree that ambiguities will be construed against the
drafter.147
When one considers Posner’s analysis and the employee’s perspective, it
is evident that the principle of consent does not resolve the issue in Lamps
Plus. Perhaps the employer wouldn’t have agreed to the contract if it
thought ambiguities would be resolved in favor of class arbitration, but then
perhaps the employee wouldn’t have agreed to the contract if it thought ambiguities would be resolved in favor of the drafting party.148
At this point, one might object that my analysis is unrealistic: Of course
the employee would still have agreed to the contract if it had explicitly forbidden class arbitration, because the contract would have been offered as a
take-it-or-leave-it condition of employment.149 Individual workers lack the
power to resist the imposition of terms like these.150 Indeed, they are unlikely to read the fine print of arbitration contracts—or even necessarily
know that they have agreed to them—in any event.151
147
Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 33 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 563, 580 (2006).
148
Randy Barnett argues that terms in form contracts that were “radically unexpected” by
one of the parties are not part of what they objectively consented to. Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 639–40 (2002). We can put the debate
in Lamps Plus into Barnett’s terms: Chief Justice Roberts argues that reading a general arbitration agreement to permit class arbitration would be radically unexpected by the employer; the
dissent argues that reading an ambiguity in the arbitration agreement in favor of the employer
would be radically unexpected by the worker. Barnett’s understanding of consent offers arguments to both sides and cannot resolve the dispute between them.
149
See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts: The Rise of Delayed Term, Standard Form Employment Agreements, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 637, 639 (2007) (noting that employment arbitration agreements are typically “boilerplate documents, unilaterally drafted by the
employer and presented as a condition of employment, often subsequent to the start of work”);
see also Lisa J. Bernt, Tailoring A Consent Inquiry to Fit Individual Employment Contracts, 63
SYRACUSE L. REV. 31, 31–32 (2012) (“The setting for individual employment contracts is
often one where the employee is ignorant about his legal rights, lacks information, and is
rushed into a take-it-or-you-don’t-work agreement. The provisions are sometimes tucked into
what appears to be a pile of routine paperwork.”).
150
See supra note 14.
151
See Varela v. Lamps Plus, Inc., No. CV 16-577-DMG (KSX), 2016 WL 9110161, at *1
(C.D. Cal. July 7, 2016) (“On Varela’s first day of work, he signed multiple documents, including an arbitration agreement, as a condition of his employment with Lamps Plus. Varela contends that he does not remember signing this document or having its contents explained to him,
but does not contest the fact that he signed it.”), aff’d, 701 F. App’x 670 (9th Cir. 2017), rev’d,
139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019) (citations omitted); Carmen Comsti, A Metamorphosis: How Forced
Arbitration Arrived in the Workplace, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 5, 8 (2014) (“Employees often have no knowledge that they are subject to forced arbitration provisions, which can
be buried in boilerplate language or the fine print of job applications, employment contracts,
and employment handbooks. Forced arbitration provisions also have been tucked into com-
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But that point undermines the Court’s entire employment arbitration jurisprudence—not just Lamps Plus, but also Epic Systems and even the modern origin point of that jurisprudence, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.152
If the “first principle that underscores all of our arbitration decisions is that
arbitration is strictly a matter of consent,”153 then it seems difficult to justify
binding workers to arbitration agreements that they have no meaningful ability to resist.154 The justification must come from some external policy
consideration.155
But the lesson of Hale and Cohen is that, when we talk about consent to
contract, some external policy consideration is always doing the work. Constraints on choice are everywhere, and they are structured and backed by
legal rules. When we say that a choice to contract is a free one, we are
saying that the balance of coercion on either side is consistent with principles of policy and morality, and that it does not permit either side to exercise
its “economic power” in a way that is “illegitimate.”156
When the Court in Lamps Plus displaced the doctrine of contra proferentem, it was making a choice. It was determining that the policy of clearing
away obstacles to individualized arbitration was more powerful than the policies that contra proferentem promotes. Although it offered the principle of
consent as its justification, that principle did not, analytically, compel a decision in favor of the employer. Indeed, as I have shown, there is a strong
argument that the Court’s decision undermines, rather than reinforces,
worker consent.
Similarly, when the Court in Epic Systems determined that agreements
with individual employees barring class arbitration were enforceable, it was
making a choice. It was determining that the policy in favor of clearing
away obstacles to individual arbitration was more powerful than the policies
supporting collective action by workers. As in Lamps Plus, the parties’ supposed consent played a key role in the Court’s reasoning. But, as in Lamps
Plus, the principle of consent could not resolve the issue. An essential prepany-wide emails, job offers, and in computerized applications on websites and workplace
kiosks.”) (footnotes omitted); see generally Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the “Opportunity
to Read” in Contract Law, 5 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 1 (2009).
152
532 U.S. 105 (2001) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act applies to all contracts of
employment except for those involving transportation workers).
153
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1415 (2019) (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted).
154
Indeed, as Magaret Radin argued forcefully, the notion of consent provides a weak
basis for justifying the enforcement of boilerplate contracts in general. See MARGARET JANE
RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 82–96
(2013). Given the constraints facing individual workers, Radin’s argument can be applied even
more powerfully in the employment context.
155
Cf., Nathan B. Oman, Reconsidering Contractual Consent Why We Shouldn’t Worry
Too Much About Boilerplate and Other Puzzles, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 215, 216 (2017) (recognizing that consent-based theories cannot easily justify enforcement of boilerplate contracts
but arguing that the utility of such contracts in solving problems of social coordination provides a sufficient justification).
156
Singer, supra note 77, at 491.
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mise of the National Labor Relations Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act—
the two statutes on which the employees relied—is that workers acting alone
lack sufficient bargaining power to enter into truly free agreements with
their employers.157 Recall Chief Justice Hughes’s explanation of the reasons
Congress protected workers’ rights to engage in concerted activities: “[A]
single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer” because “if the
employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave the employ and resist arbitrary and unfair
treatment.”158
As in Lamps Plus, then, both sides in Epic Systems could make an argument based on the principle of consent. The employers could argue that they
could not be bound to engage in class arbitration when they had not consented to proceeding on a class basis, and the workers could argue that they
could not be bound by an agreement to individual arbitration that their employers imposed on them individually as a condition of employment. By
resolving the case in favor of the employers’ rather than the workers’ perspective, the Court made a choice. It chose to give more weight to the policy favoring arbitration than to the policy favoring collective action as a
means of rectifying bargaining-power imbalances.159

157
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2018) (stating that the NLRA responded to “[t]he inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or
actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of
ownership association”); NLRB v. City Disposal Sys. Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 835 (1984) (“[I]n
enacting § 7 of the NLRA, Congress sought generally to equalize the bargaining power of the
employee with that of his employer by allowing employees to band together in confronting an
employer regarding the terms and conditions of their employment.”). Justice Ginsburg made
this point squarely in her dissent. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1633,
1633–34 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
158
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937).
159
In his Epic Systems opinion, Justice Gorsuch argued that the workers’ unequal-bargaining-power argument was foreclosed by the Court’s earlier employment arbitration decisions,
notably Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); see Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at
1630–31 (arguing that “the dissent’s real complaint lies with the mountain of precedent” the
Court had created under the Federal Arbitration Act). In understanding the options open to the
Court in Epic Systems, Justice Gorsuch makes a fair point. The dissenters in Circuit City
argued that Congress had exempted employment arbitration from the Federal Arbitration Act,
precisely because of concern with “the potential disparity in bargaining power between individual employees and large employers.” Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 132 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 138–39, 139 n.3 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting congressional “concern
that arbitration could prove expensive or unfavorable to employees, many of whom lack the
bargaining power to resist an arbitration clause if their prospective employers insist on one”).
But Justice Ginsburg offered the reasonable response that the Court’s decision marked a significant step beyond that prior precedent. See Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In any event, my point is that the Court’s employment-arbitration jurisprudence
represents a judicial policy choice. Whether the Court first made that choice in Epic Systems,
in Circuit City, or in some case in between, my point is the same.
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2. Janus
As I showed in Part I, there is a significant tension between Janus and
the Roberts Court’s employment arbitration cases. In Janus, the Court found
that workers were coerced into paying agency fees even though they could
have avoided those fees simply by seeking another job. In Epic Systems and
Lamps Plus, by contrast, the Court found that workers had freely consented
to waive their rights to pursue class proceedings even though those waivers
were the price of keeping their jobs. When we view these cases through the
lens of the Legal Realist critique, however, we can see that there is a deep
similarity between them. In particular, just as in the arbitration cases, the
invocation of coercion in Janus hides the policy choices the Court is making—choices that disfavor the policy of enabling workers to join together to
assert their interests and disregard the way that such collective action can
expand the scope of choices actually available to workers.
As a historical and doctrinal matter, it is easy enough to see why the
Janus Court did not hold that workers had consented to the agency fee by
accepting jobs in a unionized workplace. Janus was a First Amendment
case. “In modern times it has become insufficient to assert that, because an
employee has no constitutional right to a government paycheck, his employment is a mere privilege whose various conditions are beyond the First
Amendment’s purview.”160
But that raises the question why the Court did not apply the Janus understanding of free choice to its employment arbitration cases. If we understand conditions on employment as coercive despite the worker’s option of

160
Randy J. Kozel, Free Speech and Parity: A Theory of Public Employee Rights, 53 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1985, 2005 (2012). The early twentieth-century law of public employee
speech gave crucial weight to the worker’s freedom to seek a job elsewhere—as captured in
Justice Holmes’s famous statement that “[t]he petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.” McAuliffe v. City of New
Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). However, the Supreme Court turned strongly against
Holmes’s aphorism during the McCarthy era. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 144 (1983)
(collecting cases). For the classic argument that the force of Holmes’s aphorism had been
eroded—and that Holmes’s approach should be rejected entirely—see William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV.
1439, 1442 (1968). One can, of course, agree that Holmes was wrong but also reject the
holding in Janus. If a job condition that requires the payment of an agency fee is not analogous to a job condition that prevents “talk[ing] politics,” McAuliffe, 29 N.E. at 517, then there
is no contradiction. See, e.g., Kate Andrias, Janus’s Two Faces, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 21, 34
(2018) (“[T]he Court never offered a satisfying explanation for why requiring workers to
subsidize a union (or requiring citizens to subsidize another representative organization) constitutes a violation of the First Amendment.”); William Baude & Eugene Volokh, The Supreme
Court, 2017 Term—Comment: Compelled Subsidies and the First Amendment, 132 HARV. L.
REV. 171, 171 (2018) (“The better view, we think, is that requiring people only to pay money,
whether to private organizations or to the government, is not a First Amendment problem at
all.”); El-Haj, supra note 65, at 1306 (“Fair-share service fees do not impinge any employee’s
‘constitutional right to talk politics’ by forcing a choice between employment and exercising
rights protected by the freedom of speech or association.”) (footnotes omitted).
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exit, how can the acceptance of an arbitration agreement, imposed as a condition of employment, be treated as consent?
Perhaps the answer is simply the public-private distinction. The constitutional guarantee of free speech, which is the legal protection that was formally at issue in Janus, applies only to government actors.161 That doctrinal
rule reflects the premise that government actions come backed with greater
power to coerce than do private actions.162 So perhaps the reason the Court
more readily found coercion in Janus than in its arbitration cases is that, in
fact, conditions of government employment place more pressure on workers
than do conditions of private employment.
The analysis of Hale and Cohen should lead us to be skeptical of such a
claim. As they showed, there is no clean public-private distinction to be
found here.163 Government coercion lies behind the hiring and firing decisions of private employers. Practically speaking, workers in the public sector are likely to have as much ability to walk away from objectionable
contract terms as do workers in the private sector.164 In both sectors, most
workers face “asymmetric vulnerability”—they need their job more than
their employer needs them.165 Because conditions of public employment are
not likely to be more coercive than conditions of private employment, the
difference between Janus and the arbitration cases is most plausibly understood as reflecting a difference in policy judgments about the kind of condition at issue in each case: The Court simply places a higher value on the
process of arbitration than on the financing of collective bargaining
representatives.
But from the perspective of “real freedom”166 or the “actual power of
free initiative,”167 that policy judgment is perverse. As we have seen, the
premise of the Wagner Act is that workers lack meaningful freedom of
choice unless they can band together to bargain collectively.168 Agency fees

161
With some exceptions, statutory and common-law rules generally do not protect political speech against private employers. See Bagenstos, supra note 14, at 257.
162
See generally Van Alstyne, supra note 160, at 1460–62.
163
See Singer, supra note 77, at 477–95 (showing how the Legal Realists undermined the
public-private distinction); Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1351–52 (1982) (same).
164
See Kermit Roosevelt III, Not As Bad As You Think: Why Garcetti v. Ceballos Makes
Sense, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 631, 639–40 (2012) (arguing that government employers have
no greater coercive power over their employees than do private employers). For an argument
that private employers have substantial coercive power, see ALEXANDER HERTEL-FERNANDEZ,
POLITICS AT WORK: HOW COMPANIES TURN THEIR WORKERS INTO LOBBYISTS ch. 5 (2018).
165
See supra note 14 and accompanying text. There might, of course, be other reasons to
distinguish government and nongovernment workplaces. See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Market
Norms and Constitutional Values in the Government Workplace, 94 N.C. L. REV. 601, 639
(2016).
166
Cohen, supra note 85, at 587.
167
Hale, supra note 78, at 478.
168
See supra text accompanying notes 124–26.
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are plausibly necessary to ensure that workers can do so.169 Without an
agency-fee arrangement, individual workers have an incentive to free-ride;
they will benefit from whatever bargain their union reaches, but they can
avoid paying their fair share to support the union in its efforts. But the
behavior that is individually rational for a given worker will, engaged in
collectively, severely hamper the ability of a union to amplify the workers’
bargaining power.170 The agency fee solves this collective action problem by
ensuring that all workers who benefit from a union’s activities pay for their
fair share of those activities. As a result, although the agency fee is imposed
on workers as a condition of employment, its overall effects may be to increase workers’ range of choices on net by making it possible for the workers to band together effectively.171
Indeed, rather than seeing the agency fee as having been imposed on
workers, it makes at least as much sense to understand the exaction of that
fee as an exercise of worker choice. Strictly speaking, it was not the state
that imposed the agency fee requirement in Janus. The fee emerged as the
outcome of a negotiation—a negotiation between the state and the union that
government employees had elected to represent their interests.172 Indeed, it
was the union who sought the agency fee requirement. A majority of the
workers in the bargaining unit chose to be represented by the union. To
make that choice effective, they needed to collect a fair-share fee from those
other workers who would benefit from the representation.173
The Roberts Court took precisely this view of worker choice in 14 Penn
Plaza v. Pyett,174 one of its arbitration cases. There, the Court held that a
169

See Brishen Rogers, Three Concepts of Workplace Freedom of Association, 37 BERKEJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 177, 216 (2016).
170
See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 76–91 (1965).
171
See Andrias, supra note 160, at 45–48; Cynthia Estlund, The “Constitution of Opportunity” in Politics and in the Courts, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1447, 1462–63 (2016); Cynthia Estlund,
Are Unions a Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 169, 216–17 (2015) [hereinafter
“Estlund, Constitutional Anomaly”]; Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political
Speech and Association Rights After Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023,
1075–77 (2013). Robert Hale himself made essentially that same argument when he testified
in favor of the National Labor Relations Act. He argued that if a worker “belongs to a union
in a closed shop industry, it is perfectly true he has no freedom to work without being a
member of the union, but he has a little more freedom through the brotherhood of his union
against the restraint imposed upon him by the employer.” To Create a National Labor Board:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1934).
172
As Luke Norris shows, the labor activists who pushed for the NLRA “argued that
worker self-government was not only consonant with the nation’s ethos but also was necessary
for workers to become the kinds of economically un-dominated people that citizenship in the
republic demanded. When workers formed in a union to deliberate on their shared goals and
ends, they engaged in a democratic act and expression of freedom in everyday life.” Luke
Norris, Constitutional Economics, 28 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 15 (2016).
173
While Janus was pending, Benjamin Sachs argued that agency fees are best understood
not as being paid by individual workers to the union but instead as being paid by the state to
the union. See Benjamin I. Sachs, Agency Fees and the First Amendment, 131 HARV. L. REV.
1046, 1046 (2018). One’s acceptance of that argument likely correlates with one’s acceptance
of the Legal Realist premises that the Court ignored in Janus.
174
556 U.S. 247, 257 (2009).
LEY
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union’s decision to accept an arbitration agreement can bind individual
workers whom the union represents.175 Because the union must be elected
by a majority of the bargaining unit—and has a duty to fairly represent everyone in the unit—the Court said that it is proper to treat the union as the
voice of the workers that makes choices in their name.176 That is true even if
not all individual employees would agree with those choices. But although
the agency fee requirement in Janus resulted from collective bargaining, the
Court treated that requirement as one imposed upon—rather than chosen
by—the workers.
My point is not that the view of worker choice reflected in 14 Penn
Plaza is right and the one reflected in Janus is wrong. Rather, the point is
that the principle of worker choice cannot resolve either case. That principle
cannot tell us whether the Janus Court should have sided with the minority
of objecting workers (as it ultimately did) instead of with the majority of
workers who had chosen union representation (as the 14 Penn Plaza Court
had). As Hale and Cohen’s analysis helps us see, there was simply no avoiding coercion of some employees in Janus: Either the workers who chose to
band together would coerce the objectors into paying their fair share, or the
workers who refused to pay their fair share would coerce the union supporters into having no effective collective representation. Just as in Lamps Plus
and Epic Systems, the Court chose the view of worker choice that gave short
shrift to the policy of collective action as a means of checking employer
power.177
3. Hobby Lobby
In Hobby Lobby, the Court treated the employers as having been coerced by the ACA’s contraception mandate.178 But Hale and Cohen’s analysis
severely complicates the question of coercion, because it requires us to consider the full set of ways in which the government empowers the employers,
as well as the ways in which it limits their freedom. Unlike in the arbitration
cases and Janus, the Hobby Lobby Court did at least hint at the complexity
of the coercion question. But it gave the matter short shrift.
Were the employers coerced? As Elizabeth Sepper points out, “[t]he
federal government has long provided significant tax benefits to employers
for compensating employees with health benefits in the place of wages.”179
175

See id.
See id. at 270–72.
177
My argument here is similar to that of Brishen Rogers, who argues that the Court’s
recent union-fee jurisprudence reflects a choice of a “neoliberal” versus a “civil libertarian”
or “social democratic” understanding of worker freedom of association. See Rogers, supra
note 169, at 182.
178
See supra text accompanying notes 67–73.
179
Sepper, supra note 5, at 1485. For a similar argument, see Nomi Maya Stolzenberg,
It’s About Money: The Fundamental Contradiction of Hobby Lobby, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 727,
739–41 (2015).
176
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The ACA’s contraception mandate can be understood as simply stating a
condition on an employer’s receipt of those tax benefits: If the employer
wants the federal subsidy for providing health care to its employees, it must
“cover a minimum set of health benefits including contraception and other
preventive care.”180 As I noted above, one could also see the contraception
mandate as a condition on employers’ decision to take the corporate form—a
decision that offers very substantial benefits to the employer.181
And what about coercion of the workers? As we have seen, Hale and
Cohen were particularly attentive to the ways in which the law of property
gives employers coercive power over their workers.182 And the contraception mandate can be seen as a response to just that sort of coercion.183 Absent the mandate, employers could impose employment terms that provided
health insurance but did not cover contraception. As Frederick Gedicks
points out, the effect of that imposition is likely to be quite substantial:
It is well documented that failure to cover approved contraceptives
in an employer health plan imposes significant out-of-pocket costs
on employees, who then have to pay for the excluded contraceptives with after-tax wages instead of having them fully covered by
insurance that they pay for only in part and with pre-tax wages.184
Doctrinally, the Court was forced to address the effect of the mandate
on workers, because the government sought to defend the mandate’s burden
on religious practice as the least restrictive means of serving the compelling
interest of ensuring access to contraception.185 The Court “assume[d] that
the interest in guaranteeing cost-free access to the four challenged contraceptive methods is compelling within the meaning of RFRA.”186 But it held
that the mandate was not the least restrictive means of achieving that interest, because the government could serve it just as well by either paying for
180
Sepper, supra note 5, at 1485; cf. Robert L. Hale, Rate Making and the Revision of the
Property Concept, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 214 (1922) (“Ownership is an indirect method
whereby the government coerces some to yield an income to the owners. When the law turns
around and curtails the incomes of property owners, it is in substance curtailing the salaries of
public officials or pensioners.”).
181
See supra text accompanying notes 68–70; cf. Daniel A. Crane, Lochnerian Antitrust,
1 NYU J.L. & LIBERTY 496, 511 (2005) (“Even in the Lochner era, the liberty of contract and
of property did not entail a right to invoke the privileges of the corporate form and then insist
on the right to be left alone by the government to expand the corporation to a monopolistic
size.”).
182
See supra text accompanying notes 77–98.
183
See Caroline Mala Corbin, Corporate Religious Liberty, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 277,
302–03 (2015) (“[W]hile some dissatisfied employees may be able to find a comparable fulltime position without difficulty, the assumption that employees are always able to choose
employers whose values match their own relies on a Lochner-era view of employment
opportunities.”).
184
Frederick Mark Gedicks, One Cheer for Hobby Lobby: Improbable Alternatives, Truly
Strict Scrutiny, and Third-Party Employee Burdens, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 153, 170
(2015).
185
See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 727 (2014).
186
Id. at 728.
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contraception itself or requiring the objecting employer’s insurance issuer or
third-party administrator to pay.187 The Court thus concluded that the effect
on workers of excusing objecting employers from the mandate “would be
precisely zero.”188
There are good reasons to doubt that conclusion. Gedicks makes a
powerful argument that neither of the Court’s proposed alternative policies is
ever likely to come into force, given political and economic realities.189 Absent such an alternative, workers “would be forced to pay the costs of
Hobby Lobby’s observance of its anti-contraception beliefs, beliefs that employees may not themselves hold or observe.”190
So the degree of coercion the mandate imposed on employers was plausibly less than the Court suggested. As well, the degree of coercion employers imposed on their workers absent the mandate was plausibly greater than
the Court suggested. Does that mean that the Court was wrong to suggest
that the mandate coerced objecting employers? Not necessarily. Recall a
key lesson of the Hale/Cohen analysis: The party on each side of a transaction typically has some state-backed power to coerce its counterparty. To
say that a law is impermissibly coercive is, therefore, to elevate the importance of some of the law’s coercive effects over others. And that is a determination that turns on moral or policy considerations external to the concept
of coercion.191
The Hobby Lobby Court touched on this question in a somewhat elliptical footnote. Although it recognized that the effects of a challenged regulation on third parties “will often inform the analysis of the Government’s
compelling interest and the availability of a less restrictive means of advancing that interest,” the Court refused to “giv[e] the Government an entirely
free hand to impose burdens on religious exercise so long as those burdens
confer a benefit on other individuals.”192 The Court explained that:
187

See id. at 728–31.
Id. at 693.
Gedicks, supra note 184, at 162–63 (footnote omitted).
190
Id. at 174; see also Sepper, supra note 5, at 1507 (noting that “[a]s a practical matter,
[Hobby Lobby] detrimentally affected employees” and that “more than a year later, employees
of Hobby Lobby and other companies that have received religious exemptions lacked contraceptive coverage”).
191
For an application of the Hale/Cohen analysis to Hobby Lobby, see Nelson Tebbe,
Micah Schwartzman & Richard Schragger, When Do Religious Accommodations Burden
Others?, in THE CONSCIENCE WARS: RETHINKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN RELIGION, IDENTITY,
AND EQUALITY 328, 340 (Susanna Mancini & Michel Rosenfeld eds., 2017) (footnote
omitted):
188
189

In sum, burdens on third parties can be identified neither by assuming a naturalized
state of nonintervention by the government, nor by assuming that government programs always set the proper point of reference for measuring burdens. Instead of
either of these methods, we should measure burdens by referring to the substantive
public commitments—including constitutional values—implicated in a particular
case. That is the lesson applied by the realists during the progressive era, and that is
the most nuanced and powerful approach today.
192
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 730 n.37.
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it could not reasonably be maintained that any burden on religious
exercise, no matter how onerous and no matter how readily the
government interest could be achieved through alternative means,
is permissible under RFRA so long as the relevant legal obligation
requires the religious adherent to confer a benefit on third
parties.193
One way of reading that footnote is as demanding that courts balance a
regulation’s burden to an employer’s religious exercise against the unique
benefits that the regulation provides to workers.194 If the burden imposed is
small enough, or the benefit to workers is great enough, then the regulation
will survive RFRA scrutiny. Seen in that way, Hobby Lobby footnote 37 is
consistent with the Hale/Cohen analysis.195
But there is another way of reading the footnote. The Court’s language
could be read to treat the pre-regulatory world as the baseline against which
to measure redistribution: the mandate is a “burden” imposed on employers
to require them to “confer a benefit on other individuals.”196 As Sepper
argues, this language suggests that the Court understands regulation as “redistributing gains from a private order built on consent.”197 Gedicks and his
coauthor Rebecca Van Tassell go further and argue that the Hobby Lobby
footnote means that an interest in religious accommodation will often override third-party interests in cases involving “social welfare and other laws
that regulate the claimant’s behavior for the benefit of others.”198
Gedicks and Van Tassell’s interpretation is certainly not the only reading of the footnote, and in my view is probably not the best one. The footnote expressly recognizes that the effects of a religious objection on third
parties are relevant to the analysis of whether to honor that objection under
RFRA.199 And it seems to say that the law will not honor the objection if the
government interest in avoiding those third-party effects is compelling and
cannot “be achieved through alternative means.”200
Still, when one combines the Court’s language (which seems to treat the
unregulated market as the baseline) with the Court’s holding (which seems to
193
194

Id.
“Unique” benefits in the sense that the challenged regulation is necessary to provide

them.
195
See Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court, 2017 Term—Foreword: Rights As Trumps?,
132 HARV. L. REV. 28, 46 (2018) (reading the Hobby Lobby opinion, particularly in conjunction with Justice Kennedy’s pivotal concurrence, as applying this sort of balancing analysis).
196
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 730 n.37.
197
Sepper, supra note 5, at 1498–99, 1505–06 (“Like the lower courts, [the Hobby Lobby
Court] perceived a return to the pre-ACA status quo as neutral toward employees (simply
withholding benefits), whereas regulation burdened employers (imposing an obligation ‘to
confer a benefit’).”).
198
Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, Of Burdens and Baselines: Hobby
Lobby’s Puzzling Footnote 37, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 323, 331
(Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders & Zöe Robinson eds., 2015).
199
See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 730 n.37.
200
See id.
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give too little weight to the actual burden workers will face absent the contraception mandate), the reasons for Gedicks and Van Tassell’s concern become apparent. As in the arbitration cases and Janus, the Court has once
again undervalued the importance of regulation in protecting workers against
state-backed coercion by their employers.
III. BROADER IMPLICATIONS: THE LOCHNERIST PREMISES THAT STILL
UNDERLIE EMPLOYMENT LAW
Those Roberts Court cases are not an anomaly. More than eighty years
after the supposed rejection of Lochner in Jones & Laughlin and West Coast
Hotel, central doctrines of employment law rest on Lochnerist premises.
Leading scholar Steve Willborn had it right when he said that “[c]onsent is
everywhere in employment law.”201 But courts too often refuse to engage
with the coercive aspects of the employment relationship, and they often
give too little weight to the role of the law in checking employers’ coercive
power. The Legal Realist analytical tools developed by Hale and Cohen
offer a powerful lens for critiquing those doctrines.
I first discuss courts’ determination of who is an “employee” and who
is an “employer.”202 “Employee” status is the ticket for entry to the protections afforded by virtually all labor and employment laws, and those protections generally apply only against an entity that has the status of an
individual’s “employer.” The continuing Lochnerist premises of the law
lead courts to interpret these terms too narrowly. The result is to undermine
efforts to rectify imbalances in bargaining power and efforts to protect workers’ other interests. I then turn to the at-will rule. I show that it, too, rests on
Lochnerist premises.203 These premises, and the influence of the at-will doctrine itself, undermine constitutional, statutory, and common law protections
in the workplace.204
201
Steven L. Willborn, Consenting Employees: Workplace Privacy and the Role of Consent, 66 LA. L. REV. 975, 992 (2006).
202
See infra text accompanying notes 205–47.
203
See infra text accompanying notes 253–359.
204
My work builds on that of other scholars, who have highlighted the continuing
Lochnerist premises of particular labor law doctrines. See, e.g., Richard Blum, Labor Picketing, the Right to Protest, and the Neoliberal First Amendment, 42 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 595 (2019); Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere,
46 STAN. L. REV. 305 (1994); Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union Representation Elections,
and the First Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356 (1995); James Gray Pope, How
American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales, 103 MICH. L. REV. 518 (2004);
see also Kate Andrias, The Fortification of Inequality: Constitutional Doctrine and the Political Economy, 93 IND. L.J. 5, 15 (2018) (detailing ways in which the Supreme Court has
“reinforc[ed] inegalitarian distributions of power” in its labor cases); Estlund, Constitutional
Anomaly, supra note 171, at 225–28 (2015) (critiquing the notion of coercion that underlies the
Taft-Hartley Act’s prohibitions on certain labor picketing); see generally JAMES B. ATLESON,
VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1983); Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62
MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978); Moshe Zvi Marvit, On the Greatest Property Transfer That Wasn’t:
How the National Labor Relations Act Chose Employee Rights and the Supreme Court Chose
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A. The “Employee”-“Employer” Relationship
The trigger for most labor and employment protections under state and
federal law is a determination that a worker is an “employee” rather than an
“independent contractor.”205 And those protections tend to attach only to the
firm or firms that are “employers” of a particular worker; businesses up the
supply chain do not generally have employment law responsibilities.206
Through the years, the employee/contractor line—along with the related
question of which firms are “employers” of a given employee—has been a
significant point of controversy in labor and employment law. This controversy has recently focused on the status of workers in the so-called “gig
economy,” such as Uber or Lyft drivers.207 But these issues have arisen
across all sectors of work.208
The stakes of determining who is an employee and who is an employer
are monumental. If workers are deemed to be independent contractors, they
will not receive the protections of the vast body of labor and employment
protections adopted in the Progressive, New Deal, and Civil Rights Eras.
And if the firm that is deemed to be the employer cannot pay a judgment,
those protections will prove hollow even if they formally apply.
When courts resolve these questions, however, they often rest on a
Lochnerian premise of free contract. Courts have tended to use one of two
tests for determining whether a worker is an “employee” and whether a firm
is an “employer”: The common law “control” test and the “economic realities” test applied in Fair Labor Standards Act and other cases. In the past
several years an approach that focuses on entrepreneurial opportunities has
also become popular. Under any of these approaches, a court will start with
the terms of the contract between the worker and the hiring party. Some
recent developments offer reasons for hope, however. In particular, employment law reformers have successfully pressed several states to adopt the
“ABC test,” which may help avoid the Lochner problem.
Under the classic common law “control” test, a court looks to “the
hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which the product is
accomplished.”209 The “right to control” is not a natural or inherent right. It
Property Rights, 38 S.U. L. REV. 79 (2010). Unlike that work, I focus on the two most fundamental doctrines of labor and employment law—the employer/employee question and the atwill rule—and I show how their continued Lochnerist premises undermine the goals of labor
and employment law in general.
205
See, e.g., TIMOTHY P. GLYNN, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & RACHEL S. ARNOW-RICHMAN,
EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS LIMITATIONS 5–6 (4th ed. 2019).
206
See, e.g., DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR
SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 183-213 (2014).
207
See, e.g., Richard A. Bales & Christian Patrick Woo, The Uber Million Dollar Question: Are Uber Drivers Employees or Independent Contractors?, 68 MERCER L. REV. 461
(2017).
208
See generally WEIL, supra note 206.
209
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992). See also WEIL, supra
note 206 (showing that the control test also applies to determining who is an employer).
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is one that finds its source in the contractual arrangement between the parties
and it is also a right that is highly manipulable. David Weil’s work demonstrates that lead firms often allocate key aspects of control to poorly capitalized intermediaries who will be the ones on the hook as “employers.”210
And Julia Tomassetti has shown that sophisticated firms can readily characterize workers’ actions as the “ends” for which the parties have contracted
rather than as the “means” of performing the contract.211 As a result, they
can evade the obligations of labor and employment law without making any
real change in their operations.212 They can demand that workers accept
these evasive contract terms, and many workers will lack effective power to
say no.213
But because the common law “control” test focuses on what sorts of
control the hiring party has once the work relationship begins, without giving attention to the background conditions under which the parties enter into
and set the terms of the relationship in the first place, it will treat all of these
terms as freely chosen by the worker. As Noah Zatz points out, the definition of “employment” thus replicates the problems with yellow-dog contracts: “The same employer power that necessitates labor law cannot be
allowed to circumvent labor law . . . by forcing employees to agree to verbal
characterizations of themselves as nonemployees ineligible to unionize and
then giving force to those agreements.”214

210

See WEIL, supra note 206.
See Julia Tomassetti, From Hierarchies to Markets: Fedex Drivers and the Work Contract as Institutional Marker, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1083, 1137 (2015) [hereinafter
“Tomassetti, From Hierarchies”]; Julia Tomassetti, The Contracting/Producing Ambiguity
and the Collapse of the Means/Ends Distinction in Employment, 66 S.C. L. REV. 315, 315
(2014) [hereinafter “Tomassetti, Contracting/Producing”] .
212
See Martin H. Malin, Protecting Platform Workers in the Gig Economy: Look to the
FTC, 51 IND. L. REV. 377, 382 (2018) (“The common law right to control test is malleable. In
the current round of litigation, some platform workers may win their battles to be classified as
employees. But, in the end, the platforms will undoubtedly win the war.”) (footnote omitted).
213
Although many workers who receive the “independent contractor” label have significant bargaining power, a very large fraction of workers who receive that label are likely to lack
any meaningful power to negotiate the terms of their hire. See, e.g., Keith CunninghamParmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment in the Modern Economy, 96 B.U. L.
REV. 1673, 1684 (2016) (noting that “some low-skilled employees such as janitors and restaurant servers who once indisputably enjoyed employee status now work for businesses that
designate them as independent contractors”); id. at 1686 (noting that “one-third of on-demand
workers say either that they cannot find traditional employment or that they earn forty percent
or more of their income by working in the gig economy”); Martha T. McCluskey, Are We
Economic Engines Too? Precarity, Productivity and Gender, 49 U. TOL. L. REV. 631, 639, 644
(2018) (discussing lack of bargaining power for workers in contingent jobs and the gig economy); Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment Law for
Workers Without Workplaces and Employees Without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 251, 279 (2006) (stating that “nearly thirty-two percent, or 3.3 million individuals”
listed as independent contractors, “are in construction, agriculture, manufacturing, and transportation” and are likely to “have little independence or autonomy and depend upon another
business for their livelihood”).
214
Noah D. Zatz, Beyond Misclassification: Tackling the Independent Contractor Problem
Without Redefining Employment, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 279, 289 (2011).
211
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One might think that the “economic realities” test applied in Fair Labor
Standards Act cases could solve this problem.215 That test is supposed to be
a less formalistic, more capacious test of employment, one designed to prevent businesses from evading their labor law obligations.216 But “[i]n practice, the economic realities test does not operate much differently from the
control test.”217 Often, courts applying the “economic realities” test continue to focus on questions of control, but rather than looking simply to the
letter of any formal contract between the parties, they look to the relationship demonstrated by their entire course of dealing. If the hiring party “really” has control over the means and manner of performance, the court will
find an employment relationship even if the written contract does not expressly provide for such control.218 But that analysis, too, is contractual—it
simply looks as much to the tacit terms of the parties’ agreement as to the
express ones.219 A court is likely to start with the express terms in any
event.220 But however the court identifies that agreement, the crucial point is
215
See, e.g., Goldberg v. Whitaker House Co-op. 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961) (stating that “the
‘economic reality’ rather than ‘technical concepts’ is to be the test of employment”).
216
See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities and Title
VII, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75, 113 (1984) (arguing that the “flexibility” of the economic
realities test “avoid[s] the rigidity of the common law test and to accommodate the present
range of employment relationships and the new patterns that may evolve in the future”).
217
Jooho Lee, The Entrepreneurial Responsibilities Test, 92 TUL. L. REV. 777, 795 (2018);
see, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF EMP. LAW § 1.01 reporter’s note to cmts. d-e (AM. LAW INST. 2019)
(“Decisions interpreting the meaning of the term ‘employee’ under the federal antidiscrimination laws illustrate the lack of any sharp distinction between the common-law test, at least as
formulated in Reid and Darden, and a multifactor economic-realities test.”); Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How It Ought to Stop
Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 314 (2001) (“There was, however, no clear
dividing line between the common law control test and the modern economic realities test.
Both have control and domination as their central concern; the former purporting to focus on
control over the worker’s performance of services for the employer as a matter of contractual
right, and the latter purporting to look at an employer’s sources of power that give it true, if not
contractually specified, control.”); id. at 338 (describing overlap between the Supreme Court’s
current description of the “control” test and its past understanding of the “economic realities”
test); Zatz, supra note 214, at 282 (arguing that the “control” and “economic realities” tests
are both “vague” and that “they overlap sufficiently” that “they can easily produce the same
results”).
218
See, e.g., Lee, supra note 217, at 796 (arguing that “most courts” applying the economic realities test “continue to look to the element of managerial control as an important—
and often the first—factor to be considered”).
219
The institutional economist John Commons—a contemporary and fellow-traveler of
Legal Realists like Hale and Cohen—argued that the at-will rule means that the employment
relationship is “not a contract,” but is instead “a continuing implied renewal of contracts at
every minute and every hour, based on the continuance of what is deemed, on the employer’s
side, to be satisfactory service, and, on the laborer’s side, what is deemed to be satisfactory
conditions and compensation.” JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 285
(1924). For an excellent application of Commons’ argument to the who-is-an-employee problem, see Julia Tomassetti, Contracting/Producing, supra note 211, at 349–62.
220
Consider the approach taken by the Restatement of Employment Law:

The underlying economic realities of the employment relationship, rather than any
designation or characterization of the relationship in an agreement or employer policy statement, determine whether a particular individual is an employee. Thus, even
an agreement stating that a service provider is an “independent contractor” would
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this: to the extent that the “economic realities” test focuses entirely on control within the parties’ contractual relationship, and does not look to the effective freedom the workers had to decide to enter into that relationship, it
continues to replicate the yellow-dog contract problem.
Sometimes courts applying the “economic realities” test do look beyond the relationship between the worker and the hiring party. If “workers
are genuine entrepreneurs,” these courts say, “then they do not depend economically on any single firm for work and thus do not require the FLSA’s
protection.”221 But, as Keith Cunningham-Parmeter shows, these courts
often dramatically overstate the worker’s exit options. These courts conclude that workers who operate small side businesses “lack[] ‘economic
dependence’ on a single company”—even if their side businesses are so
small that they cannot realistically walk away from their main line of
work.222 This vision of worker as freely choosing entrepreneur, divorced
from the realities of bargaining power, is precisely the one Justice Pitney
indulged in Coppage.
Veena Dubal demonstrates that “the cultural and political veneration of
the ‘entrepreneur’ as the ideal citizen-worker has greatly influenced doctrinal
analysis of who constitutes a worker for the purposes of employment protections.”223 The influence is most apparent in the D.C. Circuit’s well-known
decision in FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB.224 There, the court held that
FedEx delivery drivers were independent contractors rather than employees.225 The court explained that “an important animating principle” in
not be controlling. But at the same time, the terms of a contract between a service
provider and a recipient of the services may help determine the extent of the principal’s control over how the services are to be provided and whether the service provider is free to operate as an independent businessperson.
RESTATEMENT OF EMP. LAW § 1.01, cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
221
Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 213, at 1698. For example, in Thibault v. Bellsouth
Telecomms., Inc., 612 F.3d 843 (5th Cir. 2010), the court concluded that a splicer was not an
employee, in significant part because he “did not work exclusively for the defendants. He had
his own business selling picnic tables, storage buildings, and customized golf carts, in his
home state of Delaware.” Id. at 846.
222
Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 213, at 1698–99.
223
Veena B. Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?: Contesting the Dualism of Legal
Worker Identities, 105 CAL. L. REV. 65, 81 (2017).
224
563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The Restatement of Employment Law also prominently features the worker-as-entrepreneur concept. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP. LAW § 1.01
(AM. LAW INST. 2019), (“An individual renders services as an independent businessperson and
not as an employee when the individual in his or her own interest exercises entrepreneurial
control over important business decisions, including whether to hire and where to assign assistants, whether to purchase and where to deploy equipment, and whether and when to provide
service to other customers.”). On the differences between the FedEx and Restatement versions
of the entrepreneurial test, see Matthew T. Bodie, Participation As A Theory of Employment,
89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 661, 689–90 (2013) (“[W]hile both the D.C. Circuit and the Restatement focus on entrepreneurialism, the court’s ‘entrepreneurial opportunities’ test focuses on
whether employees have a legal right to pursue economic gain outside of the relationship. The
Restatement’s test, on the other hand, looks at the degree of entrepreneurial control exercised
by the parties within the relationship.”).
225
See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 495.
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resolving ambiguous questions regarding whether a worker is an employee
“is whether the position presents the opportunities and risks inherent in entrepreneurialism”—that is, “whether the putative independent contractors
have significant entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss.”226
By emphasizing the drivers’ “potential entrepreneurial opportunity,”
rather than “realized entrepreneurial opportunity or practice,” the FedEx
Home Delivery court “implicitly placed value on the ‘freedom’ of the worker
to entrepreneuralize himself while subverting his right to act collectively.”227
For example, where FedEx imposed new terms on its drivers—including
new route assignments, changes in required hours, and changes in rates of
pay—the court treated the company’s action as simply starting a new negotiation with the workers, not as controlling their work.228
FedEx structured its contracts in a way that shifted many of the enterprise’s economic risks to the drivers, while reserving to itself many of the
attendant economic opportunities. That a worker would agree to such a lopsided arrangement might be taken as evidence of a significant imbalance of
bargaining power.229 But the FedEx court did not even discuss that imbalance. If anything, as Tomassetti shows, the court’s reasoning seemed paradoxically to “transform some of the same vulnerabilities that place the
drivers within the policy concerns of minimum-wage and collective-bargaining law into evidence of their autonomy.”230 The court’s approach thus
“adds insult to injury” by “validat[ing] th[e company’s] shifting of risks
and further weaken[ing] the already disadvantaged workers by refusing to
apply protective employment standards to them.”231
Dubal describes the FedEx Home Delivery decision as “reflect[ing] a
particular idealization of the ‘entrepreneur’ and the cultural and political philosophies of neoliberalism, typified by the idea that workers should be liberated by the free market and unencumbered by the state’s protections.”232
What she sees as neoliberalism could just as easily be seen as Lochnerism.233
FedEx Home Delivery rests on the vision of workers as freely choosing the
arrangements under which they work, and it disregards the constraints on

226

Id. at 503 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Dubal, supra note 223, at 94–95.
See, e.g., Tomassetti, supra note 211, at 1116–17 (“While it might appear that FedEx
was controlling the work in determining delivery areas, the parties were really just reopening
negotiations.”).
229
One might object to such an arrangement on substantive grounds as well. See Lee,
supra note 217, at 832–33 (“If entrepreneurs are able to expose their employees to the risks
associated with market participation while retaining the opportunity to profit from their enterprise, they wrong not only their employees but the rest of society by contributing to the misallocation of resources.”).
230
Tomassetti, supra note 211, at 1094.
231
Guy Davidov, Who Is A Worker?, 34 INDUS. L.J. 57, 67–68 (2005).
232
Dubal, supra note 223, at 70.
233
See David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 10–11 (2014) (arguing that neoliberalism is in many respects a
modern-day form of Lochnerism).
227
228
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worker choice that led to the enactment of laws like the National Labor
Relations Act—the very statute the court purported to apply. The case is
thus fairly understood as a modern-day heir to Justice Pitney’s opinion in
Coppage.
Some courts have sought to reverse these trends and implement a test of
who is an employee that gives full weight to the importance of counteracting
employer power. The most prominent example, which builds on statutory
and judicial efforts in other states,234 is the California Supreme Court’s 2018
decision in Dynamex Operations West v. Superior Court235—a decision the
California legislature recently codified in significant part.236 Dynamex, like
FedEx Home Delivery, involved the claims of delivery drivers.237 But unlike
the FedEx Home Delivery court, the Dynamex court concluded that the drivers were employees.238 And unlike the FedEx Home Delivery court, the
Dynamex court directly connected its “employee” definition to the law’s employer-checking goals.
In the introductory section of its opinion, the Dynamex court highlighted “the potentially substantial economic incentives that a business may
have in mischaracterizing some workers as independent contractors.”239 The
court noted that regulatory agencies had estimated that misclassification
costs “millions of workers of the labor law protections to which they are
entitled.”240 It held that, “in light of [the] history and purpose” of California wage-and-hour regulations, the employee definition under those regulations “must be interpreted broadly to treat as ‘employees’ . . . all workers
who would ordinarily be viewed as working in the hiring business.” 241 But it
held that “the type of individual workers, like independent plumbers or electricians, who have traditionally been viewed as genuine independent contractors who are working only in their own independent business,” would
not be covered by that definition.242
The Dynamex court fleshed out that general definition in two ways,
both of which were designed to lead to broader application of wage-andhour protections. First, the court placed the burden squarely on the hiring
party to show that a worker was an independent contractor and not an employee.243 Second, the court adopted the “ABC test” that worker advocates

234
See generally Anna Deknatel & Lauren Hoff-Downing, ABC on the Books and in the
Courts: An Analysis of Recent Independent Contractor and Misclassification Statutes, 18 U.
PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 53, 55 (2015).
235
416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018).
236
See CAL. LABOR CODE § 2750.3 (West 2019).
237
See Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 5.
238
See id. at 41.
239
Id. at 5.
240
Id.
241
Id. at 7.
242
Id.
243
See Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 35.
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have recently favored.244 That test requires the hiring party to show all three
of the following:
(A) that the worker is free from the control and direction of the
hiring entity in connection with the performance of the work, both
under the contract for the performance of the work and in fact; and
(B) that the worker performs work that is outside the usual course
of the hiring entity’s business; and (C) that the worker is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or
business of the same nature as the work performed.245
Under the ABC test, a lack of control is thus not enough for a conclusion that a worker is an independent contractor. Accordingly, the ways in
which employers can manipulate the control and economic realities tests
seem less likely to be available.246
When the Dynamex court adopted the ABC test, it did so expressly to
impose a counterweight to employers’ bargaining power. For example, the
court explained that a key purpose of this test was to protect workers against
being effectively forced to agree to independent-contractor arrangements
that waived employment-law protections:
Treating all workers whose services are provided within the usual
course of the hiring entity’s business as employees is important to
ensure that those workers who need and want the fundamental protections afforded by the wage order do not lose those protections.
If the wage order’s obligations could be avoided for workers who
provide services in a role comparable to employees but who are
willing to forgo the wage order’s protections, other workers who
provide similar services and are intended to be protected under the
suffer or permit to work standard would frequently find themselves displaced by those willing to decline such coverage.247
Under a contrary rule, the court explained, “employers might be able to
use superior bargaining power to coerce employees . . . to waive their pro-

244
Id. For the New Jersey Supreme Court’s adoption of the ABC test, which was particularly influential to the Dynamex court, see Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, 106 A.3d 449, 463 (N.J.
2015). For a general discussion of recent efforts by reformers to adopt the ABC test, see
Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 234, at 64–78; see also WEIL, supra note 206, at
204–05 (recommending adoption of the ABC test to ensure that workers are protected in the
“fissured workplace”).
245
Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 35. The (B) requirement has some overlap with Matt Bodie’s
proposal that workers who are part of the hiring party’s single process of joint production
should be treated as employees. See Bodie, supra note 224, at 705–06.
246
See John A. Pearce II & Jonathan P. Silva, The Future of Independent Contractors and
Their Status as Non-Employees: Moving on from A Common Law Standard, 14 HASTINGS BUS.
L.J. 1, 28 (2018) (arguing that “the ABC Test eliminates the most easily manipulated factors”
of the control test).
247
Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 37.
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tections.”248 When the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the same test, it
similarly explained that “the ‘ABC’ test fosters the provision of greater income security for workers, which is the express purpose of” the state wageand-hour laws.249
There is, of course, room for employers and courts to manipulate the
ABC test. Two pressure points are apparent: the definition of the “usual
course of the hiring entity’s business,” and the determination of what constitutes an “independently established trade.” There is some indication that
employers are already seeking to press the ambiguities in these terms.
Naomi Sunshine, for example, points out that “some companies require
drivers to set up business entities themselves so as to create the appearance
that the company is contracting with small businesses, not individuals.”250
Moreover, after the California Legislature codified the ABC test, Uber and
Lyft announced their position that their drivers still did not satisfy the definition of “employee,” because, on the companies’ view, driving was not part
of the “usual course” of their business.251 So far, however, courts applying
the ABC test have largely—though not entirely—held firm against efforts to
narrow the “employee” category.252 The Dynamex approach thus offers a
promising tool to overcome the legacy of Lochner in the who-is-an-employee debate.
B. Employment-at-Will—And Its Domination Over
Workplace Protections
Employment-at-will stands as the baseline rule nearly everywhere in
the United States.253 Under that rule, an employer is free to “terminate an
employee for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all.”254 Scholars
have long seen continued adherence to employment-at-will as an example of

248

Id. (quoting Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 302 (1985)).
Hargrove, 106 A.3d at 464.
250
Naomi B. Sunshine, Employees As Price-Takers, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 105,
152–53 (2018).
251
See, e.g., Shirin Ghaffary, Uber’s Baffling Claim That Its Drivers Aren’t Core To Its
Business, Explained, VOX (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/9/16/20868916/
uber-ab5-argument-legal-experts-california, archived at https://perma.cc/J4DW-8ECS.
252
See Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 234, at 97–101.
253
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF EMP. LAW § 2.01, Reporter’s Note to cmt. a (“The at-will
default rule is presently recognized in 49 states and the District of Columbia.”). For a suggestion that courts vary in their adherence to the at-will rule, see Scott A. Moss, Where There’s atWill, There Are Many Ways: Redressing the Increasing Incoherence of Employment at Will, 67
U. PITT. L. REV. 295, 300 (2005).
254
Bagenstos, supra note 14, at 244–45; see also Matthew T. Bodie, The Best Way Out Is
Always Through: Changing the Employment at-Will Default Rule to Protect Personal Autonomy, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 223, 228 n.20 (noting that the “for any reason or no reason at all”
language appears in literally hundreds of cases involving at-will employment).
249
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undead Lochnerism.255 It is easy enough to draw the connection. Key Lochner-Era cases like Adair v. United States and Coppage v. Kansas, after all,
explicitly relied on and defended the regime of at-will employment.256 The
leading modern supporter of the doctrine, Richard Epstein,257 has repeatedly
praised the analysis of Coppage in particular258—the very analysis at which
the Legal Realists aimed their attacks.259
As I show in the remainder of this section, key defenses of employment-at-will have been based on the premise that the doctrine advances
worker choice. Consideration of the Realist critique demonstrates that the
effects of the doctrine on worker choice are ambiguous. If employment-atwill is to be defended, that defense must rest on some principle of policy or
morality that goes beyond choice. The stakes are particularly high because
the background doctrine of at-will employment has the effect, in both doctrine and practice, of undermining an array of workplace protections.
1. Employment-at-Will and Worker Choice
Defenders of employment-at-will argue that the doctrine promotes
worker choice. They note that the doctrine authorizes both employers and
employees to terminate the relationship at any time and thus frees workers
from being contractually bound to their employers.260 Because employmentat-will is merely a default rule, they argue that the doctrine preserves the
ability of workers to contract for greater protections if they wish. In particular, they observe that employers and employees generally do not opt out of
the at-will baseline.261 They argue that in many cases employment-at-will is
more efficient than alternative termination rules.262 For these reasons, defenders of the at-will baseline contend that the doctrine reflects the preferences of most workers.263

255
See, e.g., Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1416–19 (1967);
Bodie, supra note 254, at 225.
256
See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S.
161, 172–76 (1908).
257
See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947,
951–53 (1984).
258
See Epstein, supra note 61, at 1366 n.29; Richard A. Epstein, Skepticism and Freedom:
The Intellectual Foundations of Our Constitutional Order, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 657, 671–72
(2004).
259
Indeed, Epstein specifically argues that Hale was wrong because Coppage was right.
See Richard A. Epstein, The Assault That Failed: the Progressive Critique of Laissez Faire, 97
MICH. L. REV. 1697, 1705–06 (1999).
260
See Epstein, supra note 257, at 954–55.
261
See id. at 953–56; J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term
Employment Contracts: Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 837, 898–900.
262
See Epstein, supra note 257, at 964–66; Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8, 50–51 (1993).
263
See Epstein, supra note 257, at 951–52.
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The worker-choice justification for employment-at-will finds expression in the doctrine as well. Most states have now recognized a “public
policy” exception to the at-will presumption.264 But courts tend to limit the
exception to cases in which the discharge will harm third parties beyond the
employer-employee relationship.265 This doctrine rests on the premise of
worker choice, because it refuses to intervene to protect the workers who
could presumably have taken care of themselves through contract. It intervenes only when necessary to protect outsiders. The employee’s consent
cannot legitimate the harm an action imposes on third parties.
Does employment-at-will really promote worker choice, though? To
answer that question, we need to look not just to the formal rights workers
have under the doctrine but at the coercive power created by the broader
structure that surrounds the relationship between worker and employer.
When one engages in that deeper analysis, one will find serious problems
with the claim that the at-will doctrine promotes worker choice.
Start with the defense based on formal equality. It is true that, as a
formal matter, the at-will rule is evenhanded. Both employers and employees may terminate the relationship at any time. The Supreme Court expressly relied on this supposed equality when it gave constitutional
significance to at-will employment in its Lochner Era decisions. As the
Court said in Adair v. United States, “the right of the employee to quit the
service of the employer, for whatever reason, is the same as the right of the
employer, for whatever reason, to dispense with the services of such employee.”266 Modern defenders of the rule have similarly pointed to its evenhanded nature.267
As cases like Adair and Coppage show, at-will employment was one of
the central “common law baselines”268 against which Lochner-Era courts
identified impermissible redistribution. And the supposed equality between
employer and employee was crucial to the Court’s analysis. The Adair opinion, for example, explained that “the employer and the employee have
equality of right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary
interference with the liberty of contract which no government can legally
justify in a free land.”269 The Court said that “it cannot be . . . that an
employer is under any legal obligation, against his will, to retain an em-

264
See RESTATEMENT OF EMP. LAW § 5.01, cmt. a (“A clear majority of jurisdictions
recognizes such a limit when the employer discharges an employee in violation of a wellestablished public policy.”).
265
See generally Stewart J. Schwab, Wrongful Discharge Law and the Search for ThirdParty Effects, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1945 (1996).
266
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174–75 (1908) (overruling recognized in Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941)).
267
See Epstein, supra note 257, at 954–55 (defending the rule in part on these grounds).
268
Sunstein, supra note 131, at 874.
269
Adair, 208 U.S. at 175.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\55-2\HLC201.txt

2020]

unknown

Seq: 45

23-SEP-20

Consent, Coercion, and Employment Law

14:09

453

ployee in his personal service any more than an employee can be compelled,
against his will, to remain in the personal service of another.”270
But as Hale and Cohen showed, to treat the employer’s ability to terminate an employee as equivalent to the worker’s ability to walk away is to
disregard the overall context of their relationship. In Cohen’s words,
“though men may be legally free to make whatever contract they please,
they are not actually or economically free.”271 Despite the at-will rule’s formal equality, observers have recognized that in most cases it is the employer, rather than the employee, who has the real power to decide whether
to terminate the relationship.272 As Elizabeth Anderson writes, “[i]t is an
odd kind of countervailing power that workers supposedly have to check
their bosses’ power, when they typically suffer more from imposing it than
they would suffer from the worst sanction bosses can impose on them.”273
The equality defenses of the at-will doctrine thus draw the frame too narrowly by failing to consider the broader context in which the employer and
employee make their termination decisions.
Those defenses also draw the frame too narrowly in another respect:
They fail to consider the way that the at-will rule creates inequality between
employers and employees during the course of the relationship. In his classic attack on employment-at-will, Lawrence Blades argued that the doctrine
“forces the non-union employee to rely on the whim of his employer for
preservation of his livelihood” and thus “tends to make him a docile follower of his employer’s every wish.”274 Workers who live in fear of arbitrary
termination must submit to a “boss’s dominion” that “goes beyond what
simply serves the productive mission of the workplace and potentially extends to any aspect of the worker’s life.”275 Thanks to the threat imposed by
the at-will rule,
workers ‘can be commanded to pee or forbidden to pee’; can be
‘forbidden to wear what they want, say what they want (and at
what decibel), and associate with whom they want’; and ‘can be
fired for donating a kidney to their boss (fired by the same boss,
that is), refusing to have their person or effects searched, calling
the boss a ‘cheapskate’ in a personal letter, and more.’276

270

Id. at 175–76.
Cohen, supra note 86, at 563.
272
See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 14, at 245; Blades, supra note 255, at 1405; see generally Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65 (2000).
273
ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: HOW EMPLOYERS RULE OUR LIVES
(AND WHY WE DON’T TALK ABOUT IT) 56 (2017).
274
Blades, supra note 255, at 1405.
275
Bagenstos, supra note 14, at 246.
276
Id. at 245.
271
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Clyde Summers wrote that under the at-will doctrine “the employer has
sovereignty” over its workers.277 That “deeply rooted conception” itself
rests on assumptions about property rights: “The employer, as owner of the
enterprise, is viewed as owning the job,” and that “property right gives the
employer the right to impose any requirement on the employee, give any
order and insist on obedience, change any term of employment, and discard
the employee at any time.”278 It is hard to miss the echo of Hale and Cohen
in Summers’s argument (even though Summers does not cite them).279 Cohen described the law as granting property owners a form of “sovereignty”
over those with whom they deal, and he and Hale both focused on the way
the law empowers some private actors to exercise coercion over others.280
As Cohen wrote, property law gives employers “dominion over things”—
dominion that becomes “imperium over our fellow human beings.”281 Even
if we believe that workers make a free decision to enter into at-will employment, any analysis of whether the at-will doctrine serves worker choice must
take into account the way that the doctrine limits worker choices once they
are on the job.
And there are substantial reasons to doubt the conclusion that workers
are making a free choice to enter into at-will employment.282 Many at-will
employees in fact believe that the law protects them against arbitrary termination, which suggests that they did not actually choose to forgo such a
protection.283 Workers might not know about the at-will default or the op277
Summers, supra note 272, at 68; see generally Hugh Collins, Is the Contract of Employment Illiberal?, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LABOUR LAW, supra note 21, at 48.
278
Summers, supra note 272, at 78 (2000); see also Jack M. Beermann & Joseph William
Singer, Baseline Questions in Legal Reasoning: The Example of Property in Jobs, 23 GA. L.
REV. 911, 946 (1989) (“The employment-at-will doctrine rests on a particular construction of
property rights as well as contract rights. It protects employers’ property rights against claims
by workers that they have a right of access to employers’ property.”).
279
Elizabeth Anderson’s argument that employers exercise the power of “private government” is very much in the same tradition, and also resonates strongly with the arguments Hale
and Cohen made in the first part of the Twentieth Century (though Anderson does not cite
them). See ANDERSON, supra note 273, at 53–54, 60 (“Under the employment-at-will baseline, workers, in effect, cede all of their rights to their employers, except those specifically
guaranteed to them by law, for the duration of the employment relationship.”). (The influence
of Legal Realist ideas is especially strong in id. at 47–48.) The phrase “private government”
is one that numerous commentators have attributed to Hale. See e.g., Duxbury, supra note 86,
at 434 (describing “Hale’s notion of private government” as “a particularly novel contribution
to th[e] debate” over the public-private distinction); Hiba Hafiz, Beyond Liberty: Toward A
History and Theory of Economic Coercion, 83 TENN. L. REV. 1071, 1100 (2016) (“Hale
originated the concept of ‘private government’ to explain how the acquisition and exercise of
private rights in a market economy governed resource allocation and income distribution.”);
Samuels, supra note 100, at 266 (“Arthur S. Miller quoted Hale as an originator of the concept
of ‘private government,’ a notion basic to Hale’s analysis.”) (quoting Arthur S. Miller, Private
Governments and the Constitution, in THE CORPORATION TAKE-OVER 138–39 (Andrew Hacker
ed. 1964)).
280
See supra text accompanying notes 75–94.
281
Cohen, supra note 91, at 13.
282
For a nice summary, see Bodie, supra note 254, at 233–38.
283
See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 146–48 (1999);
Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, and Why Does It Matter?,
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portunity to contract around it. They might fail, simply due to inertia, the
endowment effect, or other status quo bias, to change the default term.284
They might be afraid to ask for a just cause term out of a fear of signaling
“that they may be ‘lemons’—that is, shirkers or boundary-testers—whose
costs to the employer will be more than the wage adjustment associated with
the term.”285 And, of course, workers may simply have no realistic option to
say no to at-will employment; that may be the only sort of job on offer to
them.
In any event, in most states the employment-at-will doctrine operates
more powerfully than a normal default rule. Courts typically treat an employment contract as at-will unless there is “‘unequivocal’ or ‘unambiguous’
evidence” to the contrary.286 “Even an employer statement that the employee will be discharged only for ‘good reason’ or ‘good cause’ is insufficient when there is no agreement on what those terms encompass.”287
Courts are unlikely to consider “contextual evidence” regarding what the
parties agreed to,288 nor will they consider what the employer “leads employees to reasonably believe.”289 Many courts will decline to accept an oral
agreement to depart from the at-will default (even though most employment
contracts are oral) but will instead require such a departure to be in writing.290 And in many cases, even “[i]f an employer expressly agrees to give
up his power to discharge at will,” courts “will not enforce that promise
without ‘special consideration.’” 291 That an employee works under an at-

77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6, 9 (2002); Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A
Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
105, 105–06 (1997); Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences on
Workers’ Legal Knowledge, U. ILL. L. REV. 447, 452 (1999); Jesse Rudy, What They Don’t
Know Won’t Hurt Them: Defending Employment-at-Will in Light of Findings That Employees
Believe They Possess Just Cause Protection, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 307, 317–38
(2002).
284
See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1113 (2000)
(“The fact that parties rarely contract around the ‘at will’ rule might mean that ‘at will’ employment is efficient for most parties, but it also might mean that the status quo bias swamps a
preference many parties would otherwise have for a ‘just cause’ term.”); cf. Omri Ben-Shahar
& John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 676–80
(2006) (noting that employers and workers rarely contract around the default rule, regardless
of whether the default is a strong rule of at-will employment, a weak rule of at-will employment, or even a rule that termination should be only for cause).
285
Walter Kamiat, Labor and Lemons: Efficient Norms in the Internal Labor Market and
the Possible Failures of Individual Contracting, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1953, 1959 (1996).
286
Bodie, supra note 254, at 229.
287
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
288
Id.
289
Summers, supra note 272, at 70.
290
See Bodie, supra note 254, at 230–31.
291
Peter Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment as a Case Study of the Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323, 376 (1986).

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\55-2\HLC201.txt

456

unknown

Seq: 48

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

23-SEP-20

14:09

[Vol. 55

will contract—or a contract that a court construes to be at will—thus does
not suggest that the worker chose that term in any meaningful way.292
All of this suggests that the doctrine of at-will employment cannot be
justified simply by reference to the concept of worker choice. The effects of
that doctrine on worker choice operate in multiple dimensions at multiple
times, and they push in multiple directions. The net effect is incalculable,
and it is as likely to be negative as it is to be positive. As Cohen observed in
The Basis of Contract, “the element of consent on the part of the employee”
is relatively “minor,” even under current law.293
None of this means that the employment-at-will doctrine cannot be justified. What it means is that any justification for that doctrine must rest on
some principle of policy or morality that goes beyond choice.294 Some of its
defenders, for example, argue that the at-will presumption promotes efficiency within the employment relationship.295 Others defend the presumption on macroeconomic grounds. By making it easier for employers to fire
less effective workers, they contend, at-will employment allows enterprises
to be nimbler and increases their incentives to hire workers in the first
place.296 Empirical studies finding that some of the recognized exceptions to
the at-will rule are associated with an increase in unemployment provide
some support for this view.297
Opponents of the doctrine disagree that the presumption is efficient.298
They argue that “if fairness at work is a benefit that workers value but employers tend to under-provide, for example because of adverse selection effects, dismissal legislation can induce an increase in labour supply and also
help shift the employment exchange to a more efficient contractual equilibrium.”299 Even if employment-at-will reduces hiring, they argue, these effects are likely to be small in the long term, and they are likely to be
balanced by positive macroeconomic effects that come from reduced job
turnover, increased incentives to invest in human capital, and associated increased productivity.300 A recent multi-national empirical study found that
292
Beermann & Singer, supra note 278, at 940 (arguing that if workers believe they can
be fired only for cause, then “employment-at-will cannot be justified as the free contract
position”).
293
Cohen, supra note 86, at 569.
294
See supra text accompanying notes 117–21.
295
See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 257, at 962–73.
296
See, e.g., Edward P. Lazear, Job Security Provisions and Employment, 105 Q. J. ECON
699, 699 (1990).
297
See, e.g., David H. Autor, John J. Donohue III & Stewart J. Schwab, The Costs of
Wrongful Discharge Laws, 88 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 211, 211 (2006).
298
See, e.g., Note, Protecting at Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1833–34 (1980).
299
Zoe Adams et al., The Economic Significance of Laws Relating to Employment Protection and Different Forms of Employment: Analysis of a Panel of 117 Countries, 1990–2013,
158 INT’L LAB. REV. 1, 3 (2019).
300
See id. at 3 (“The overriding message from the voluminous literature on the economic
effects of labour laws is that the theoretical effect of firing restrictions on employment levels is
ambiguous.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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employment protection legislation is associated with both an increase in employment and an increase in workers’ share of national income, providing
some support for this argument.301
Opponents also challenge at-will employment on noneconomic
grounds. For example, my previous work has argued that employment-atwill undermines social equality, because it helps to create and maintain illegitimate status hierarchies.302 These debate are outside the scope of this Article. The point is merely that employment-at-will must find its justification
in these sorts of policy arguments, rather than in the principle of worker
choice.
2. Employment-at-Will and Its Effect on Workers’ Rights More
Generally
The Lochnerist underpinnings of employment-at-will are of surpassing
importance, because the persistence of the at-will baseline has the effect of
undermining all manner of protections for workers—whether those protections derive from the common law, from statutes, or even from the Constitution. In this way, the spirit of Lochner still lives throughout employment
law.
Start with the common law. Over the last two decades, employers’ efforts to control workers’ off-the-job speech and to intrude on workers’ otherwise private spaces and choices have been a frequent subject of controversy
and litigation.303 But the at-will baseline has made judges wary of recognizing common law protections against these efforts. Protecting workers’
speech or privacy, after all, would impose limits on the reasons why an employer could terminate the employment relationship—limits that would
stand in tension with the background principle that the relationship can be
terminated for any reason or no reason at all.
This has been easiest to see in the context of workers’ speech rights.
With vanishingly rare exceptions,304 courts have refused to extend their
“public policy” wrongful discharge doctrine to cases in which the employer

301
Id. at 20. For an argument that the macroeconomic data on the effects of labor-market
regulations are inconclusive, see Richard B. Freeman, Labour Market Institutions Without
Blinders: The Debate over Flexibility and Labour Market Performance, 19 INT’L ECON. J. 129
(2005).
302
See Bagenstos, supra note 14, at 244–47. In a similar vein, see ANDERSON, supra note
273.
303
See GLYNN, ET AL., supra note 205, at 315–461.
304
The oft-cited exception is Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 896–901 (3d
Cir. 1983) (applying Pennsylvania law). But Novosel has not been followed by other circuits.
See Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 618–20 (3d Cir. 1992); Edmondson v.
Shearer Lumber Prods., 75 P.3d 733, 738–39 (Idaho 2003) (“[T]he public policy adopted in
Novosel has not been endorsed by any other court, not even the Pennsylvania state courts
within the federal district of the Circuit that issued Novosel.”).
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retaliated for the employee’s political or extramural speech.305 That is true
even though suppressing such speech has fairly obvious third-party effects
by depriving the audience of information.306 The rationale these courts offer
is that the First Amendment applies only in the case of state action, so it
cannot be a source of public policy on which to base a claim for wrongful
discharge against a private employer.307 As one leading case put it, “[t]he
public policy that is mandated by the cited provisions is that the power of
government, not private individuals, be restricted.”308
The analysis of Hale and Cohen suggests that this rationale is too simplistic. The only reason private employers can discharge workers for their
speech is because state law has empowered them to do so. Lisa Bingham
describes the relationship in Haleian terms (although she does not cite Hale):
“the judicially created and enforced rule excluding free speech from protection . . . puts private-sector employers in the position of being able to knowingly coerce vulnerable and economically dependent employees.”309
Bingham argues that, as a result, the private employer’s act should count as
“state action” for constitutional purposes.310 Today’s Supreme Court would
certainly disagree.311 But either way, Hale and Cohen’s analysis shows that
the state remains deeply implicated in the employer’s conduct.
And, as Bingham points out, the conclusion that there is no “state action” is merely the starting point of the wrongful discharge analysis. To say
that there is no “state action” is to say that the employer did not violate the
First Amendment. But that is an analytically distinct question from the
question whether the First Amendment can serve as a source of “well-established public policy”312 to support a claim. The courts recognized the
wrongful discharge cause of action to provide a remedy for employer
“abuses [of] power” that did not independently violate some other source
of law.313 If the employer’s abuse already violated the law, the case would

305
See RESTATEMENT OF EMP. LAW § 5.02, reporter’s note to cmt. d. By contrast,
whistleblowing speech—in which workers bring violations of the law to the attention of public
bodies—is generally protected against employer coercion. See Bagenstos, supra note 14, at
262.
306
See Joseph Thai, The Right to Receive Foreign Speech, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 269, 278–309
(2018) (describing First Amendment interests in the receipt of information).
307
See, e.g., Borse, 963 F.2d at 619–20; Edmondson, 75 P.3d at 738.
308
Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1357 (Ill. 1985).
309
Lisa B. Bingham, Employee Free Speech in the Workplace: Using the First Amendment
as Public Policy for Wrongful Discharge Actions, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 341, 368 (1994).
310
See id. at 362–68.
311
See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 53 (1999); Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 839–42 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1010 (1982); Flagg
Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 165–66 (1978). But I agree with Professors Seidman and
Tushnet that the state action doctrine is conceptually confused, precisely because judges at
some level recognize the analytic power of the Legal Realist critique at the same time that they
attempt to protect a sphere of private conduct. See LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V.
TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 70–71 (1996).
312
RESTATEMENT OF EMP. LAW § 5.02(f).
313
Bingham, supra note 309, at 370.
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not present any question of whether a court should extend the wrongful discharge doctrine.314 As the rare court to have found a wrongful termination
cause of action in this context said, “the concern for the rights of political
expression and association” underlying the First Amendment might reflect a
“public policy” of protecting “political freedoms”—one that applies regardless of “whether the threat comes from state or private bodies.”315
Why have the courts generally refused to find “well-established public
policy” against interference with workers’ speech? Despite their near-unanimity on the point—or maybe because of it—judges have tended to offer
little analysis beyond ritualistically invoking the “state action” doctrine.316
But one clear motivation does emerge from some of the decisions—the perceived imperative to limit intrusions on employment-at-will. Thus, when the
Illinois Supreme Court declined to protect worker speech under its “public
policy” doctrine, the court endorsed “a narrow interpretation of the retaliatory discharge tort.”317 In the very next sentence, the court declared that
“[t]he common law doctrine that an employer may discharge an employeeat-will for any reason or for no reason is still the law in Illinois, except for
when the discharge violates a clearly mandated public policy.”318 Further,
when the New Mexico Supreme Court reached the same conclusion, it emphasized “that retaliatory discharge is a narrow exception to the rule of employment at will” and that the courts “have refused to expand its
application.”319
Common law protections of worker privacy present a more mixed picture because courts have often (though hardly always) recognized employees’ claims in this context.320 But the at-will baseline has had significant
effects here as well. As with the protection of worker speech, “any meaningful protection of employee privacy requires limitation of an employer’s
power to fire at will.”321 Yet courts have done a poor job of managing the
314
Id. (“[I]t was precisely because there was no other remedy that the courts had to
intervene.”).
315
Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 900 (3d Cir. 1983).
316
See, e.g., Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Prods., 75 P.3d 733, 738–39 (Idaho 2003)
(“The prevailing view among those courts addressing the issue in the private sector is that state
or federal constitutional free speech cannot, in the absence of state action, be the basis of a
public policy exception in wrongful discharge claims.”); Bushko v. Miller Brewing Co., 396
N.W.2d 167, 172 (Wis. 1986) (stating that including worker speech in the wrongful-termination doctrine would “eliminate any distinction between private and governmental employment”); Johnson v. Mayo Yarns, Inc., 484 S.E.2d 840, 843 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (“We
conclude that the plaintiff’s conduct carried out in private employment is not constitutionally
protected activity. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to support a claim of
wrongful discharge based on his activity being protected speech and expression by our
Constitution.”).
317
Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1356 (Ill. 1985).
318
Id.
319
Shovelin v. Cent. New Mexico Elec. Coop., 850 P.2d 996, 1007 (N.M. 1993).
320
See RESTATEMENT OF EMP. LAW § 7.07, reporter’s notes cmt. b (collecting cases); see
generally MATTHEW W. FINKIN, PRIVACY IN EMPLOYMENT LAW (5th ed. 2018).
321
Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment Relationship, 57
OHIO ST. L.J. 671, 676 (1996).
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tension between at-will employment and workers’ privacy rights—because
they keep tripping over the concept of employee consent.
Consent is generally a defense to an invasion of privacy. Indeed, some
would say that consent is “an integral part of what we understand privacy to
be”: The right to privacy is the right to decide with whom to share one’s
private matters.322 Steven Willborn goes so far as to say that “the only good
being protected” in the privacy context “is the employee’s ability to consent
or not to consent.”323
How, then, should we treat a worker’s decision to accept a job that the
employer conditions on giving up some privacy interest? Does the acceptance constitute consent to what would otherwise be a privacy invasion?
Note that the same question can arise for an at-will employee if the employer
imposes the condition at some point after hire. Because the employer can
end the relationship at any time, the new condition is the equivalent of the
employer firing the worker and then offering to rehire on new terms.
As Hale and Cohen’s analysis indicates, the concept of “consent” cannot answer the question whether the term is acceptable. At least once the
condition is made clear, the worker’s acceptance of (continued) employment
on that condition does constitute a form of consent, in the sense that the
worker considered it the best of available options. But the worker’s decision
is made in a coercive context—as are all such decisions. To decide whether
to treat the intrusion on privacy interests as impermissible requires some
concept that goes beyond “choice” or “consent.”324 The analysis might, for
example, focus on the impact of the particular intrusion on personhood, autonomy, or broader equality interests, and the employer’s countervailing interest justifying the intrusion.325
For example, in Jenninvs v. Minco Technology Labs, Inc.326 a Texas
state court held that a worker could be fired for refusing to submit to urinalysis. The employee argued that, because she needed her job to live, “any
‘consent’ she may give, in submitting to urinalysis, will be illusory and not
real.”327 The court rejected the argument on the ground that “[t]here cannot

322
Willborn, supra note 201, at 975; see also id. at 979 (“Within the domain protected by
privacy, the thing that is protected is precisely the individual’s authority to consent or to withhold consent.”).
323
Steven L. Willborn, Notice, Consent, and Nonconsent: Employee Privacy in the Restatement, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1423, 1439 (2015). I have argued against Willborn’s consentfocused account of privacy. See Bagenstos, supra note 14, at 247–48.
324
See supra text accompanying notes 112–17. See generally Kim, supra note 321, at 719
(recognizing “the indeterminacy inherent in the notion of consent” in this context based on
“the difficulty of finding a principled way to distinguish fully voluntary from coerced
agreements”).
325
See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 14, at 247–53 (articulating a social-equality approach
to privacy protections); Kim, supra note 321, at 676 (arguing “that the employer has legitimate
access to those areas socially designated as highly private—what I call ‘core’ privacy interests—only to the extent necessary to achieve the purposes of the employment”).
326
765 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. App. 1989), writ denied (Dec. 13, 1989).
327
Id. at 502.
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be one law of contracts for the rich and another for the poor.”328 Indeed, the
judges said that they could not “imagine a theory more at war with the basic
assumptions held by society and its law.”329
The echoes of Justice Pitney in Coppage are evident in Jennings. But
even those courts that do not so explicitly endorse Lochnerist premises still
give significant weight to (compromised) worker consent. The doctrine
often requires a reasonable expectation of privacy, for example. If an employer notifies workers that they cannot expect certain spaces or actions to
be private—or requires workers to sign a waiver of any right to privacy—
courts will often say that the worker’s consent demonstrates the lack of any
reasonable expectation of privacy.330
The Restatement of Employment Law comes close to solving this problem, but it troublingly continues to rely on the concept of consent. Promisingly, the Restatement provides for wrongful discharge liability for “[a]n
employer who discharges an employee for refusing to consent to a wrongful
employer intrusion upon a protected employee privacy interest.”331 The Restatement also says in a comment that “employee consent obtained as a condition of obtaining or retaining employment is not effective consent to an
employer intrusion and does not in itself provide a defense to wrongful
intrusion.”332
The Restatement clearly recognizes the problematic nature of worker
consent, but it does not solve the problem. The “in itself” language is the
tell. Thus, the comment explains that “[b]y engaging in a certain type of
employment” that “involve[s] reduced expectations of privacy,” and by doing so “with notice of the accompanying reduced privacy, the employee effectively consents to the reasonable requirements of the position, including
intrusions in areas that would be considered private in other contexts.”333 It
is not clear why the concept of consent is necessary there, when “reasonable
requirements” should in fact do all of the work. As Professor Willborn suggests, the Restatement’s treatment of notice effectively grants employers
“considerable discretion to narrow and even eliminate” worker privacy interests.334 Although the Restatement explicitly seeks to “excise[]” the concept of consent, the notice provisions enable that concept to return through
the back door, because “one gets to consent only if there is a privacy interest
in the first place.”335
Now consider statutory and constitutional claims. Statutes protecting
workers against discrimination, or against retaliation for complaining about
328

Id.
Id.
330
See Clyde W. Summers, Individualism, Collectivism and Autonomy in American Labor
Law, 5 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 453, 472–73 (2001).
331
RESTATEMENT OF EMP. LAW § 7.07.
332
RESTATEMENT OF EMP. LAW § 7.06 cmt. h.
333
Id.
334
Willborn, supra note 323, at 1435.
335
Id.
329
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violations of law, should override common law rules like the at-will presumption. Federal statutes—where many of the crucial worker protections
are found—should certainly override state common law rules. And, of
course, rules grounded in the federal Constitution should prevail over all
other laws. But the baseline of employment-at-will has stiffly resisted being
overcome by statutory and constitutional rules.336
Some of the reasons are practical. As Cynthia Estlund demonstrated
many years ago, if employers are free to discharge workers for good reasons,
bad reasons, or no reason at all, they can easily hide the bad motive that
violates antidiscrimination or antiretaliation laws.337 “When liability depends on proof of a particular bad reason for discharge, ‘no reason’ or even a
demonstrably false or fabricated reason is good enough for the employer to
escape liability.”338
The at-will baseline has affected the doctrine as well. In statutory discrimination cases, the Supreme Court has worked hard to prevent its rules
for proving disparate treatment from encroaching on the employers’ presumed prerogative to discharge workers arbitrarily.339
In Furnco Construction Corporation v. Waters,340 for example, the
Court interpreted the second step of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
scheme341 as imposing only a relatively limited burden on employers. Under
McDonnell Douglas, plaintiffs first must establish a prima facie case by
showing that they are members of a protected class, were qualified for the
position they sought, and were rejected under circumstances indicative of

336
James Pope has similarly shown how the Supreme Court has repeatedly “elevate[d]
the state common-law rights of employers over the federal statutory rights of workers” under
the NLRA. Pope, supra note 204, at 519.
337
See Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX.
L. REV. 1655, 1671–72 (1996).
338
Id. at 1671; see William E. Forbath, The Distributive Constitution and Workers’ Rights,
72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1115, 1143 (2011) (arguing that, to prove retaliatory firing under the National
Labor Relations Act, “[i]t is the worker’s burden to show that the firing was to thwart the
union campaign, but the employer can always claim that the reason for the firing was not
talking to the union or organizing or attending a meeting—i.e., exercising one’s rights; instead,
the motivation for the firing was ‘malingering’ or ‘insubordination’ or ‘lateness’ or literally
anything else”); Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of American Work
Law, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 163, 183 (2007) (arguing that, due to the at-will doctrine, workers “frequently face an uphill battle in persuading judges that an unjust dismissal
represents a significant departure from business norms and is therefore likely the result of a
forbidden motive (e.g., race or labor organizing), rather than simply a privileged exercise in
animosity, contrariness, or whimsy”); see also Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA,
and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 46 (2000) (arguing that the atwill doctrine has undermined judicial enforcement of the Americans with Disabilities Act).
339
For a good general discussion, see generally William R. Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, the Rise of “Pretext Plus,” and the Escalating Subordination of Federal Employment
Discrimination Law to Employment at Will: Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L.
REV. 305 (1996); Chad Derum & Karen Engle, The Rise of the Personal Animosity Presumption in Title VII and the Return to “No Cause” Employment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1177 (2003).
340
438 U.S. 567 (1978).
341
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973).
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discrimination.342 At that point, the burden “shift[s] to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.”343 In Furnco, the Court held that any nondiscriminatory reason would
do, even if it was one that was objectively unreasonable or failed to account
for the interest in promoting the hiring of a diverse workforce.344 The Court
criticized the court of appeals for “requir[ing] businesses to adopt what it
perceive[d] to be the ‘best’ hiring procedures.”345 It declared: “Courts are
generally less competent than employers to restructure business practices,
and unless mandated to do so by Congress they should not attempt it.”346 As
William Corbett explains, “the Furnco admonition regarding judicial incompetence to second-guess employers parallels one of the theories explaining
the widespread adoption of employment at will by state courts. Courts
adopted the doctrine because they did not deem themselves competent to
evaluate employers’ discharge decisions.”347
Fifteen years after Furnco, the Court infused an at-will mindset into the
third stage of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme. The third
stage allows plaintiffs to prevail if they can prove that the employer’s “stated
reason for [the adverse employment action] was in fact pretext,”348 In St.
Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks,349 the Court held that plaintiffs were not necessarily entitled to prevail simply by showing that the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason proffered by the employer was pretext; the plaintiffs must
also show that the reason was a pretext for discrimination.350 As in Furnco,
the Court’s decision rested on the at-will baseline. The Court disclaimed any
“authority to impose liability upon an employer for alleged discriminatory
employment practices unless an appropriate factfinder determines, according
to proper procedures, that the employer has unlawfully discriminated.” 351
But the very question at issue in the case was whether a showing of pretext
was sufficient to require a factfinder to determine that the employer had
unlawfully discriminated.352 As Corbett argues, the Court’s statement
“reveals that the Court chose not to exercise its power by requiring the fact
finder to find discrimination when plaintiffs prove pretext, because the Court

342

See id. at 802.
Id.
344
See Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577–78.
345
Id. at 578.
346
Id.
347
Corbett, supra note 339, at 334–35; see also Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis,
Jr., The Reagan Court and Title VII: A Common-Law Outlook on A Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L.
REV. 1, 71 (1990) (describing Furnco’s “disinclination to ‘‘restructure’ private business practices” as an example of the Court’s hewing to “common-law baselines” in interpreting Title
VII).
348
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
349
509 U.S. 502 (1993).
350
Id. at 515–16.
351
Id. at 514.
352
See id. at 504.
343
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values employment at will more highly than employment discrimination law
and its underlying policies.”353
As Ann McGinley shows, St. Mary’s is but one example of a common
thread in employment discrimination cases. Judges deciding those cases
“often rely on the employment at will doctrine to defeat the plaintiff’s case”
by concluding, “[i]n essence,” that the employer has a “license to be
mean.”354 Even if plaintiffs can prove that their discharges were “wrongful[]” in some generic sense, or even were based on “animus” against
them, judges refuse to infer that the reason was discrimination based on
protected-class status.355
Reliance on the at-will baseline has even affected the Supreme Court’s
constitutional decisions. When the Court refused to apply the class-of-one
equal protection doctrine to government employment, it explained that
prohibiting arbitrary treatment of government employees would be “simply
contrary to the concept of at-will employment.”356 The Court thus pointed to
the common law at-will doctrine to justify exempting the employment context from the otherwise generally applicable constitutional principle against
arbitrary treatment.357 Indeed, across a range of different rights, the Court
has sought to ratchet down the constitutional protections available to public
employees so that the government can exercise the prerogatives available to
private employers—prerogatives that are rooted in the at-will doctrine and
the conception of employer sovereignty on which it rests.358
These developments are troublesome. If the at-will doctrine rests on an
implicit set of judicial policy judgments, that doctrine should not be permitted to “undermine decisions society has made about fundamental rights in
the workplace” through statutory and constitutional law.359 Because they
continue to give the at-will baseline dominance over democratic efforts to
protect workers’ rights, they are properly understood as descendants of
Lochner.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have attempted to show that our labor and employment
law has never truly shed the premises of Lochner. The Roberts Court’s recent decisions seem on the surface to rely on conflicting understandings of
worker choice, but—just like the infamous decisions of the Lochner-era
353

Corbett, supra note 339, at 352.
Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will: Toward A Coherent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443, 1459 (1996).
355
See id. at 1459–60.
356
Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 606 (2008).
357
See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 563–65 (2000) (applying general
prohibition of arbitrary government action outside of the employment context).
358
See Kim, supra note 166.
359
Joseph E. Slater, The “American Rule” That Swallows the Exceptions, 11 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL’Y J. 53, 58 (2007).
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Court—they are all consistent in failing to take account of the value of regulation and collective bargaining in promoting meaningful freedom for workers. It is not just the Roberts Court. Fundamental doctrines of labor and
employment law continue to rest on a view of choice that does not account
for the coercive situation in which workers find themselves. If we are to
address today’s problems of exploitation of labor, we must relearn the lessons of the Legal Realists of the early twentieth century and recognize the
importance of legal interventions to rectify imbalances of bargaining power
in the workplace.

